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To HAVE  the incentive to undertake  research  and development, a firm 
must be able to appropriate  returns  sufficient  to make the investment 
worthwhile.  The benefits consumers derive from an innovation, how- 
ever, are increased if competitors can imitate and improve on the 
innovation  to ensure  its availability  on favorable  terms.  Patent  law seeks 
to resolve  this  tension  between  incentives  for  innovation  and  widespread 
diffusion  of benefits.  A patent  confers, in theory, perfect  appropriability 
(monopoly  of the invention) for a limited time in return  for a public 
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disclosure  that  ensures,  again  in theory,  widespread  diffusion  of benefits 
when the patent  expires. 
Previous investigations of the system suggest that patents do not 
always work in practice as they do in theory.' On the one hand, 
appropriability  is not  perfect.  Many  patents  can be circumvented;  others 
provide  little  protection  because  of stringent  legal  requirements  for  proof 
that they are valid or that they are being infringed.  On the other hand, 
public  disclosure  does not always ensure  ultimate  diffusion  of an inven- 
tion on competitive terms. For example, investments to establish the 
brand  name of a patented  product  may outlive the patent itself.2 And 
patents may not always be  necessary. Studies of  the aircraft and 
semiconductor  industries  have shown  that  gaining  lead  time  and  exploit- 
ing learning  curve  advantages  are the primary  methods  of appropriating 
returns.  Other  studies  have emphasized  the importance  of complemen- 
tary  investments  in marketing  and  customer  service.3 
Evidence  on the nature  and strength  of conditions  for appropriability 
and on the working  of the patent system is, however, scattered and 
unsystematic.  Because imperfect  appropriability  may lead to underin- 
vestment in new technology, and because technological  progress is a 
primary  source of economic growth, it would be useful to have a more 
comprehensive  empirical  understanding  of appropriability,  in particular, 
to  identify those industries and technologies in which patents are 
effective  in  preventing  competitive  imitation  of a new process  or  product. 
It would also be desirable to know where patents can be profitably 
licensed. Where  patents are not effective, it would be useful to under- 
stand  why they are not and  whether  other  mechanisms  are. 
1.  F.  M. Scherer and others,  Patents  and the Coiporation:  A Report on Industrial 
Technology under Changing Public Policy,  2d ed. (privately published,  1959); and C. T. 
Taylor and Z. A. Silberston,  The Economic Impact of the Patent  System: A Stludy  of the 
British Exper-ience  (Cambridge University Press,  1973). 
2.  See,  for example,  Meir Statman,  "The Effect of Patent Expiration on the Market 
Position  of Drugs,"  in Robert B.  Helms,  ed.,  Drulgs and Health:  Economic  Issues  anid 
Policy Objectives (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute,  1981), pp. 140-51. 
3.  The  importance  of  lead  time  and learning  curve  advantages  is  documented  in 
Almarin Phillips,  Technology  and Market Structure: A  Study of  the Aircraft Indiustry 
(Lexington Books,  1971); and John E. Tilton, International Diffuision of Technology: The 
Case of Semicondiuctors (Brookings,  197  1). For the importance of marketing and customer 
service,  see Marie-Therese Flaherty, "Field Research on the Link between Technological 
Innovation  and  Growth:  Evidence  from  the  International  Semiconductor  Industry," 
working paper 84-83 (Harvard University,  Graduate School  of Business  Administration, 
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This paper describes the results of an inquiry into appropriability 
conditions in more than one hundred manufacturing  industries. We 
discuss how this information  has been and  might  be used to cast light  on 
important  issues in the economics of innovation  and public  policy. Our 
data, derived  from  a survey  of high-level  R&D  executives, are  informed 
opinions about an industry's  technological  and economic environment 
rather  than  quantitative  measures  of inputs  and  outputs. 
Although our use of semantic scales to assess,  for example, the 
effectiveness of alternative  means of appropriation  introduces  consid- 
erable measurement  error, more readily quantifiable  proxies would 
probably  not serve as well. Remarkable  progress  has been made  toward 
developing  a methodology  to estimate the economic value of patents.4 
But suitable data are as yet unavailable in the United States, and 
European  data  lack  sufficiently  reliable  detail  to support  inferences  about 
interindustry  differences  in the value of patents. Ourjudgment  was that 
asking knowledgeable  respondents  about the effectiveness of patents 
and  alternative  means of appropriation  was at least as likely to produce 
useful answers as asking for quantitative  estimates of the economic 
value of a typical  patent. 
We have taken considerable  care to establish the robustness of our 
findings  in the presence of possibly substantial  measurement  error,  but 
ultimately  the value of the data will depend on their contribution  to 
better empirical  understanding  of technological  change and more dis- 
criminating  discussion of public  policy. To view the empirical  contribu- 
tion of the data from the simplest perspective, consider their potential 
for improving  the quality  of research  that  uses patent  counts to measure 
innovative  activity.5  This  line of inquiry  has shown, among  other  results, 
that industries vary significantly  in the average number of patents 
generated  by each dollar  of R&D investment.6  Our  findings  on industry 
4.  See, especially,  Ariel Pakes,  "Patents as Options: Some Estimates of the Value of 
Holding European Patent Stocks,"  Econometrica,  vol. 54 (July 1986), pp. 755-84. 
5.  For a summary of the best of this work, see Zvi Griliches, Ariel Pakes, and Bronwyn 
H. Hall, "The Value of Patents as Indicators of Inventive Activity,"  working paper 2083 
(Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research,  November  1986). For other 
perspectives  on the usefulness  of patent data, see  the special  issue of Research  Policy, 
vol.  16 (August 1987). 
6.  F.  M. Scherer,  "The  Propensity  to Patent,"  International  Journal  of Industrial 
Organization, vol.  1 (March 1983), pp.  107-28; and John Bound and others,  "Who Does 
R&D and Who Patents?" in Zvi Griliches, ed., R&D, Patents andPProductivity  (University 
of Chicago Press for National Bureau of Economic  Research,  1984), pp. 21-54. 786  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  3:1987 
differences  in patent  effectiveness may help explain  this variation  in the 
apparent  productivity  of R&D. 
More  fundamentally,  large  and  persistent  interindustry  differences  in 
R&D  investment  and  innovative  performance  have resisted  satisfactory 
explanation, in part for lack of data that adequately represent the 
theoretically  important  concepts of appropriability  and technological 
opportunity.  Promising  but ultimately  unsatisfactory  results have been 
obtained in exploratory work that used crude proxy variables and 
econometric ingenuity  to capture the influence of appropriability  and 
opportunity  conditions.7  Our  desire to provide  a stronger  basis for this 
line of inquiry was a prominent  motive for our survey research and 
helped  to shape  its design. 
Finally, gathering  better information  on the nature  and strength  of 
appropriability  is particularly  timely  in view of the prominence  of current 
debates on the adequacy  of laws and institutions  to protect  intellectual 
property. One impetus for change has been the need to clarify and 
perhaps  strengthen  the system  of property  rights  at various  new  frontiers 
of technology. Thus, for example, recent legislation  has adapted  copy- 
right  law to protect  the rights  of the creator  of new computer  software, 
a new legal framework  has been constructed to protect intellectual 
property  embodied  in semiconductor  chip designs, and  important  court 
decisions and administrative  actions have shaped  the development  of a 
property  rights  system in biotechnology.8 
Another  spur  to change  has been the need to resolve conflicts  between 
the aims of social regulation  and the exercise of intellectual  property 
rights. For example, the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term 
Restoration  Act of 1984 extended patent lives of pharmaceuticals  to 
compensate  for regulatory  requirements  that delay the introduction  of 
new drugs. 
7. Richard  C. Levin, "Toward  an Empirical  Model  of Schumpeterian  Competition," 
working paper 43 (Yale University, School of Organization  and Management,  1981); 
Richard  C. Levin and Peter C. Reiss, "Tests of a Schumpeterian  Model of R&D and 
Market  Structure,"  in Griliches,  ed., R&D, Patents and Productivity,  pp. 175-204;  and 
Ariel  Pakes  and  Mark  Schankerman,  "An Exploration  into the Determinants  of Research 
Intensity,"  in Griliches, ed., R&D, Patents and Productivity, pp. 209-32. 
8. See Computer  Software  Act of 1980;  Semiconductor  Chip  Protection  Act of 1984; 
Diamond v.  Chakrabarty,  447 U.S.  305 (1980), holding that plant and animal life is 
patentable  under U.S.  patent law; and D. J. Quigg, memorandum  of April 7,  1987, 
explaining  the policies of the U.S. Patent  and  Trademark  Office  concerning  applications 
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Intellectual property rights also figure prominently  among policy 
issues milling under the banner of competitiveness. Recent annual 
reports  of the U.S. trade  representative  have focused on the difficulties 
U.S. manufacturers  encounter  in protecting  intellectual  property  rights 
in foreign markets. The trade bill passed in  1987 by the House of 
Representatives  contains several provisions that increase the scope of 
protection  and  the opportunities  for relief  available  to U.S. manufactur- 
ers  confronted  with  imports  that  infringe  these rights.9  Proposed  antitrust 
legislation,  motivated  by a concern  that  courts  have kept  inventors  from 
reaping  rewards  that  patent  laws are intended  to provide,  stipulates  that 
patent license agreements and similar contracts relating to  use  of 
intellectual  property  "shall not be deemed  illegal  per se under  any of the 
antitrust laws."  10 
To the extent that all this activity attempts  to rectify obvious inade- 
quacies in existing institutions,  the case for reform  appears  strong  and 
straightforward.  It is easy to deplore the blatant  copying of innovative 
integrated  circuit designs, the importation  of "knock off" copies of 
trademarked  or patented  U.S. products,  and the piracy of copyrighted 
written matter  and audio and video cassettes. But reforms may yield 
unintended  consequences. In its simplest  form, this concern translates 
into wariness about Trojan  horses: provisions brought  into the law by 
the  rhetorical  tug  of "competitiveness"  and  "intellectual  property"  may 
harbor  instruments  of protectionism  and price fixing. Other potential 
consequences  are subtler  but  no less important.  For example,  seemingly 
uniform  adjustments  of intellectual  property,  antitrust,  or trade  law may 
affect some industries  quite  differently  than  others. 
And it should not be taken for granted  that more appropriability  is 
better,  that  better  protection  necessarily  leads  to more  innovation,  which 
yields better  economic performance-higher standards  of living, better 
competitiveness,  and  so on. Better  protection  may  yield  more  innovation 
at the cost of incrementally  increasing  resources devoted to producing 
the  innovation:  the  larger  prize  may  merely  encourage  duplicative  private 
effort  to capture  it."I  Alternatively,  better  protection  may induce inno- 
9.  See H.R. 3, the Omnibus  Trade  and  Competitiveness  Reform  Act of 1987,  which  is 
currently  under  consideration  by a House-Senate  conference  committee. 
10. H.R. 557  and  S. 438, 100  Cong., 1 sess. 
11. This  is the "free  access" externality,  first  emphasized  in the context  of innovation 
in Yoram Barzel, "Optimal Timing of Innovations,"  Review of Economics  and Statistics, 
vol. 50 (1968),  pp. 348-55. For a survey of the literature  on patent  races, see Jennifer 788  Brookings Paper-s on Economic  Activity,  3:1987 
vation  of the wrong  kind,  or  it may  buy  the  innovation  by further  delaying 
access to it on competitive  terms.'2 
The premise  that stronger  protection  will always improve  the incen- 
tives to innovate is also open to challenge. Unimpeded diffusion of 
existing  technology  is immediately  beneficial  not only for consumers  but 
also for those who would  improve  that technology. Because technolog- 
ical advance  is often an interactive,  cumulative  process, strong  protec- 
tion of individual  achievements may slow the general advance. This 
would not occur in a hypothetical  world without transaction  costs, in 
which  efficient  contracts  to share  information  would  be made.  In reality, 
however, markets  for rights  to information  are subject to major  trans- 
actional  hazards,  and  strong  protection  of a key innovation  may  preclude 
competitors  from  making  socially beneficial  innovations.  The semicon- 
ductor  industry  of the 1950s  and 1960s  provides  an excellent example  of 
rapid  progress  in a cumulative  technology  that might  have been impos- 
sible under  a regime  that strongly  protected  intellectual  property.  13 
The remainder  of this paper discusses our survey instrument,  the 
construction  of the sample,  and  the interpretation  of the data, then turns 
to our findings  concerning  the effectiveness of patents  and other means 
of appropriating  the returns  from  R&D. The results  of related  work that 
employs  the survey  data  to reexamine  central  questions  in the empirical 
literature  on R&D are summarized,  and we discuss how our findings 
might contribute  to a more discriminating  discussion of patent law, 
antitrust  law, and  trade  policy. 
Questionnaire  Design and Survey Methods 
The content  of our questionnaire  was shaped  with guidance  from  the 
conceptual literature  on technological  change, empirical  literature  on 
Reinganum,  "The  Timing of  Innovation:  Research,  Development  and  Diffusion,"  in 
Richard Schmalensee and Robert Willig, ed., Handbook ofIndustrial Organization (North- 
Holland,  1988). 
12.  Richard  R.  Nelson,  "Assessing  Private  Enterprise:  An  Exegesis  of  Tangled 
Doctrine,"  Bell Journal of Economics,  vol.  12 (Spring 1981), pp. 93-111; and William D. 
Nordhaus,  Invention,  Growth, and Welfare: A Theoretical  Treatment of Technological 
Change (MIT Press,  1969). 
13.  Richard C. Levin,  "The  Semiconductor  Industry,"  in Richard R.  Nelson,  ed., 
Government and Technical Progress: A Cross-Industty Analysis (Pergamon Press,  1982), 
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the economic impact of the patent system, the work of Mansfield  and 
his associates on imitation costs,  and numerous case studies.14 The 
questionnaire  was aimed at high-level  R&D managers  with knowledge 
of both the relevant technology and market  conditions. To check the 
interpretability  of the questions  and the likely validity  and reliability  of 
the responses, we pretested the questionnaire  with twelve managers 
representing  diverse  businesses.'5 
To understand  how appropriability  differs  across  industries,  we asked 
each respondent to report typical experiences or central tendencies 
within  a particular  industry.  Respondents  were thus treated  as informed 
observers  of a line of business rather  than  as representatives  of a single 
firm,  an approach  that  encouraged  cooperation  (they were not placed in 
the  position  of possibly  divulging  practices  or  policies of their  own firms), 
but led inevitably to heterogeneity in the responses within a given 
industry. 
The questionnaire  contained four parts. Parts 1 and 2 concerned 
appropriability;  parts 3 and 4 concerned  technological  opportunity  and 
technological  advance.  Questions  in part  1  asked  about  the effectiveness 
of alternative  means of protecting  the competitive  advantages  of R&D, 
limits  on the effectiveness of patents, and ways of acquiring  knowledge 
of a competitors' technology. Part 2 asked about the cost and time 
required  to imitate  innovations  of rivals;  we distinguished  process from 
14. Among  the sources of ideas for the questions are Paul Allan David, Techniical 
Choice, Innovation and Economic  Growith:  Essays  on Americatn and British Experience 
in the Nineteenth  Centuty  (Cambridge  University  Press, 1975);  Richard  R. Nelson and 
Sidney  G. Winter,  "In Search  of Useful Theory  of Innovation,"  Research Policy, vol. 6 
(Winter  1977),  pp. 36-76;  Nathan  Rosenberg,  "Science,  Invention  and  Economic  Growth," 
Econiomic Jolurnal, vol. 84 (March  1974),  pp. 90-108; and Devandra  Sahal, Patterns of 
Technological  Innovation  (Addison-Wesley,  1981).  For empirical  literature  on the eco- 
nomic  effects of the patent  system, see Scherer  and  others,  Patents and the Coi-por  ation; 
and Taylor and Silberston,  The Economic  Impact  of the Patent  System.  For imitation 
costs, see Edwin  Mansfield,  Mark  Schwartz,  and Samuel  Wagner,  "Imitation  Costs and 
Patents:  An Empirical  Study,"  Economic  Journal, vol. 91 (December  1981),  pp. 907-18. 
15. These  managers  had  experience  in  communications  equipment,  industrial  inorganic 
chemicals,  metal  cutting  machine  tools, shoe machinery,  household  electrical  appliances, 
processed  foods, computing  equipment,  semiconductors,  copper smelting  and refining, 
radio  and TV sets, and industrial  organic  chemicals. They were asked to complete the 
questionnaire  for a specific line of business, but to keep in mind the suitability  of the 
questions  for other  lines of business  with which  they were familiar.  After  completing  the 
questionnaire,  they were interviewed  face-to-face  or by telephone. Interviews  typically 
lasted one-half  hour  or more, and each question  was discussed to eliminate  sources of 
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product innovations, major from typical, and patented from unpa- 
tented.  16  Part  3 explored  the links  between  an industry's  technology  and 
other sources of technological  contribution.  We asked about  the impor- 
tance of scientific  research  in general  and university-based  research  in 
particular.  We also asked about the extent to  which interindustry 
spillovers  are an important  source of technological  opportunity.  Part  4 
asked some broad questions about the pace and character  of techno- 
logical advance.17  This paper analyzes responses to the questions in 
parts 1  and 2.18 
SAMPLE  CONSTRUCTION 
As a sampling  frame, we used the lines of business defined by the 
Federal  Trade  Commission.  In the manufacturing  sector, these chiefly 
correspond  to four-digit  SIC industries,  although  some are defined as 
groups  of four-digit  or even three-digit  industries.  The FTC  lines provide 
the most disaggregated  level at which data on R&D expenditures  are 
available. An additional  consideration  was that F. M. Scherer's tech- 
nology flow matrix, which classifies patents by industry  of origin and 
industry  of use, was also constructed  at this level of aggregation.  19 
Ultimately,  we received responses  from  650 individuals  representing 
130  lines  of business,  with  ten or  more  responses  from  eighteen  industries 
and five to nine from twenty-seven industries.  The sample  was reason- 
16. The questions  were similar  to those in Mansfield,  Schwartz,  and  Wagner,  "Imita- 
tion  Costs  and  Patents,"  but  covered  typical  rather  than  specific  innovations.  Our  industry 
sample  was also broader. 
17. One objective was to examine "natural  trajectories"  of the sort described in 
Nelson and  Winter,  "In Search  of Useful Theory,"  p. 56. 
18. Data from  responses  to questions  in parts  3 and 4 have been used in Richard  C. 
Levin, Wesley M. Cohen, and David C. Mowery, "R&D  Appropriability,  Opportunity, 
and  Market  Structure:  New Evidence  on Some Schumpeterian  Hypotheses,"  American 
Economic Review, vol. 75 (May 1985, Papers and Proceedings,  1984), pp. 20-24; Cohen, 
Levin, and Mowery, "Firm Size and R&D Intensity:  A Re-examination,"  Journal  of 
Industrial Economics,  vol. 35 (June  1987),  pp. 543-65;  and  Richard  C. Levin  and  Peter  C. 
Reiss, "Cost-Reducing  and  Demand-Creating  R&D  with  Spillovers"(Stanford  University, 
Graduate  School of Business, 1986).  See Richard  R. Nelson, "Institutions  Supporting 
Technical  Advance  in Industry,"  American Economic Review, vol. 76 (May 1986,  Papers 
and Proceedings,  1985), pp. 186-89,  for findings  on the importance  of external  sources  of 
technological  knowledge. 
19. F. M. Scherer,  "Inter-industry  Technology  Flows in  the United  States,"  Researcl 
Policy, vol. 11  (August  1982),  pp. 227-45. R.  C. Levin, A.  K. Klevorick, R. R. Nelson,  and S.  G.  Winter  791 
ably representative  of firms  performing  R&D, though  the exclusion of 
those without  publicly  traded  securities undoubtedly  means that small 
start-up  ventures, important  sources of innovation, were underrepre- 
sented. The number  of respondents  in a line of business was positively 
correlated with the line's R&D spending, sales volume, and R&D 
intensity.  The  number  of respondents  did  not  increase  in  strict  proportion 
to the level of industry  R&D or sales, but the rate of response within  a 
line of business was not significantly  correlated with industry R&D 
spending,  sales, or  R&D  intensity.  The  Appendix  presents  further  details 
of sample  construction. 
METHODOLOGICAL  ISSUES 
Given our interest  in identifying  differences  in the appropriability  of 
R&D, it is reassuring  that analysis of variance  confirmed  the presence 
of significant  interindustry  variation  in the responses to most question- 
naire  items.20  There  was, however, also substantial  intraindustry  varia- 
tion in the responses. 
There  are several potential  sources of intraindustry  heterogeneity  in 
the  responses  to any  given  question.  First,  the lines of business  as defined 
by the FTC may be objectively heterogeneous in their products and 
technologies. For example, if two firms  classified as manufacturers  of 
industrial  inorganic  chemicals  produce  different  products  using  different 
technologies, they might differ markedly in their perception of the 
effectiveness of patents or the time required for imitation in their 
"industry.  " To eliminate  this source  of heterogeneity,  we asked  respon- 
dents to identify two major innovations-a  process and a product- 
within their industries during  the past ten to fifteen years. For most 
industries  with  ten or more  respondents,  more  than  half  the respondents 
agreed  on at least one such innovation.  We thus believe it unlikely  that 
overly  aggregated  industry  definition  was a major  source  of intraindustry 
heterogeneity.21 
20. Interindustry  differences  are significant  at the 0.05 level for approximately  60 
percent  of the  questions  in  parts  1  and  2 of the questionnaire.  If a higher  level of aggregation 
is used to measure  industry  effects, such as the level at which the National Science 
Foundation  reports  R&D spending  (a hybrid  of two- and three-digit  level industries), 
interindustry  differences  are  significant  at the 0.05 level for 70 percent  of the questions. 
21. Heterogeneity,  as anthropologists  have  long  insisted,  is, however,  in the eye of the 792  Brookings Papers  oni Economic  Activity,  3:1987 
A respondent's  perception  of the  central  tendencies  within  an  industry 
may also be affected  by his firm's  policies or strategies.  Respondents  in 
the same line of business may thus have different  perceptions of the 
common technological  environment  that they were asked to character- 
ize. A two-way  analysis  of variance  of the responses  on the effectiveness 
of patents, for example,  revealed  that  both firm  and industry  effects are 
statistically  significant.  A representative  multi-industry  firm,  however, 
tends to be involved  in technologically  related  industries,  and  thus what 
appear  to be effects attributable  to the firm  in the data  may simply  reflect 
the correlation  in responses  from  related  industries. 
The third, and probably most important, source of intraindustry 
heterogeneity  is the inherently  subjective  nature  of the semantic  scales 
used in the survey. Most answers  were reported  on a seven-point  Likert 
scale. The effectiveness of patents in preventing  duplication  was, for 
instance, evaluated on a scale ranging  from "not at all effective" to 
''very effective." There is no natural or objective anchor for such 
evaluative  ratings.  Individuals  may perceive the same environment  but 
simply  use the scale differently.  Some might systematically  favor high 
scores; others might  concentrate  responses in the center of the scale; 
still others  might  frequently  use extreme  values. 
The numerous  techniques  available  to control  for differences  among 
respondents  in means and variances  generally  require  abandoning  one 
or more dimensions along which the data might be informative. For 
example,  we were interested  in interindustry  comparisons  of answers  to 
a single  question;  controlling  for fixed  effects among  respondents  would 
vitiate  such comparisons,  since we expected a respondent's  mean score 
over all questions  to depend  on his industry.  Standardizing  the variance 
of each respondent's  answers raised similar  problems:  the distribution 
of "correct" responses was unknown  and it almost certainly differed 
systematically  among  industries.  Rather  than  impose an arbitrary  stan- 
dardization, therefore, we  examined the results for each group of 
questions using a variety of techniques and perspectives to assess the 
beholder. One R&D manager,  asked to inform us about the air and gas compressor 
industry,  inquired  whether  we were  interested  in large,  medium,  or small  compressors.  In 
his view the technologies  were fundamentally  different.  We asked him to note on his 
questionnaire  where the answers  to our questions  differed  across these size categories. 
The booklet  he returned  contained  no such notation. R.  C. Levin, A.  K. Klevorick, R. R. Nelson,  and S.  G.  Winter  793 
robustness of our principal  conclusions. There was undeniably  much 
noise in the data,  but  several  important  signals  were robust  to alternative 
weightings  of the observations,  alternative  partitions  of the sample,  and 
the use of alternative  summary  statistics.22 
We sidestepped  one methodological  difficulty  by  treating  ratings  along 
a seven-point  semantic  continuum  as if they were interval  data.  The data 
were, of course, more  properly  to be regarded  as ordinal.  It would have 
been straightforward  to treat them as ordinal  if we had been interested 
only in interindustry  comparisons  of responses to a single  question. We 
also sought, however, to  make comparisons among questions (for 
example, are patents more or less effective than secrecy in protecting 
process innovations  from duplication?),  and we therefore treated the 
data  as if they were interval.23 
One additional  methodological  concern was whether our level of 
industry  aggregation  was appropriate  for the problems  being studied. 
The FTC  line-of-business  level was chosen to facilitate  merging  the data 
with disaggregated  R&D data and Scherer's  classification  of patents  by 
industries  of origin  and  use. Our  analysis  indicated,  however, that most 
of the interesting  interindustry  distinctions  among  the 130  lines defined 
at the FTC level were robust to an aggregation  of the data into the 25 
industry  groups  used by the National Science Foundation  in its annual 
survey  of R&D spending  and employment  patterns. 
Patents and Other Means of Appropriation 
Table 1 shows the pattern  of responses, based on a seven-point  scale, 
to questions  on the effectiveness of alternative  means of capturing  and 
protecting  the competitive advantages  of new or improved  processes 
and products.  The first two columns report  the mean response for the 
22. One  notable  consequence  arising  from  the measurement  error  in the data  was that 
industry  mean  responses  from  lines of business  with  only one or two respondents  tended 
to be disproportionately  located  near  the extremes  of the distribution  of mean  responses 
to any  given  question.  Most  conclusions  based  on the  full  sample  of 130  lines, and  virtually 
all those emphasized  in this paper,  were replicated  in the smaller  sample  of 75 lines that 
had  more  than  two respondents. 
23. We designed  the questionnaire  to ensure  that  cross-question  comparisons  would 
arise  naturally  in the minds  of the respondents.  The items were arranged  in blocks, with 
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Table 1.  Effectiveness of Alternative Means of Protecting the Competitive Advantages 
of New or Improved Processes and Productsa 
Distribution  of 
Overall sample  means  industmy  meansb 
Method of appropriation  Processes  Products  Processes  Products 
Patents to prevent duplication  3.52  4.33  2.6-4.Oc  3.0-5.Oc 
(0.06)  (0.07) 
Patents  to secure royalty  income  3.31  3.75  2.3-4.0c  2.7-4.8c 
(0.06)  (0.07) 
Secrecy  4.31  3.57  3.3-5.0  2.7-4.1 
(0.07)  (0.06) 
Lead time  5.11  5.41  4.3-5.9c  4.8-6.0c 
(0.05)  (0.05) 
Moving quickly down the  5.02  5.09  4.5-5.7  4.4-5.8 
learning curve  (0.05)  (0.05) 
Sales  or service  efforts  4.55  5.59  3.7-5.5  5.0-6.1 
(0.07)  (0.05) 
Source:  Authors' calculations. 
a.  Range:  I  =  not at all effective;  7  =  very effective.  Standard errors in parentheses. 
b.  From the upper bound of the lowest  quintile of industries to the lower bound of the highest quintile. 
c.  Differences  in means significant at the .01 level. 
entire  sample  of 650  respondents  to each  question,  as well as the standard 
error of each estimated mean. These statistics, of course, give equal 
weight to each respondent  and consequently weight each industry in 
proportion  to its number  of respondents. The overall pattern across 
questions,  however,  is robust  to the  use of alternative  summary  statistics, 
such as the mean of industry  means or the median  of industry  means. 
This is apparent  in columns 3 and 4, which summarize  the distribution 
of industry mean responses to each question. Each pair of numbers 
represents the range of industry  means from the upper bound of the 
lowest quintile  to the lower bound  of the highest quintile  of industries: 
20 percent of the 130 industries  had mean responses at or below the 
bottom of the range indicated  for each question, and 20 percent had 
mean  responses  at or above the top of the range.  Mean  responses  for the 
remaining  60 percent  (or 78 industries)  fell within  the reported  range. 
The picture  is striking.  For new processes (columns  1 and 3), patents 
were generally  rated  the least effective of the mechanisms  of appropri- 
ation: only 20 percent of the lines of business surveyed rated process 
patent effectiveness in excess of 4.0. Eighty percent scored the effec- 
tiveness of lead time  and  learning  curve advantages  on new processes in R.  C. Levin, A.  K. Klevorick, R. R. Nelson,  and S.  G.  Winter  795 
excess of 4.3. Secrecy, though  not considered  as effective as lead time 
and  learning  advantages,  was still  considered  more  effective  than  patents 
in protecting  processes. 
Patents for products  were typically considered more effective than 
those for processes, and secrecy was considered less  effective in 
protecting products than processes.  Generally, lead time, learning 
curves, and sales or service efforts  were regarded  as substantially  more 
effective than patents in protecting products. Eighty percent of the 
sample businesses rated the effectiveness of sales and service efforts 
above  5.0, but  only  20  percent  considered  product  patents  this  effective.24 
The  tendency  to regard  secrecy as more  effective than  process  patents 
but  less effective than  product  patents  probably  reflects  the greater  ease 
and  desirability  of maintaining  secrecy about  process technology.  Firms 
may sometimes refrain  from patenting  processes to avoid disclosing 
either the fact or the details of an innovation.25  But firms  have every 
incentive  to advertise  the advantages  of new or improved  products  and 
to get them into the hands of customers, thereby facilitating direct 
observation  of the product  and  the technology  it embodies. Maintaining 
secrecy about  product  innovations  is thus likely to be both difficult  and 
undesirable. 
Respondents  also tended to regard  patents to prevent  duplication  as 
more effective than patents to secure royalty income. This finding  was 
consistent with the view that licensing arrangements  are beset with 
transactional  difficulties. 
Only  3 of 130  lines of business rated  process patents  higher  than  five 
on a seven-point  scale of effectiveness in preventing  duplication.  Two 
of these were concrete and primary  copper;  the other had only a single 
respondent.26  Only  5 of 130  industries  rated  product  patents to prevent 
24. This  view of the efficacy  of sales and  service  efforts  is consistent  with  the emphasis 
given to investment  in "cospecialized  assets" as a means of appropriation  in David J. 
Teece, "Profiting  from  Technological  Innovation:  Implications  for Integration,  Collabo- 
ration,  Licensing  and  Public  Policy," Research  Policy, vol. 15  (December  1986),  pp. 285- 
305. 
25. See Ignatius  Horstmann,  Glenn  M. MacDonald,  and Alan Slivinski,  "Patents  as 
Information  Transfer  Mechanisms:  To Patent or (Maybe) Not to Patent," Journal of 
Political  Economy,  vol. 93 (October  1985),  pp. 837-58, for a theoretical  treatment  of the 
issue. 
26. To preserve  confidentiality,  we do not identify  any industry  in which there was 
only  one response.  Hereafter,  we refer  to such  cases as singletons. 796  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  3:1987 
duplication  higher than six points. Two of these were singletons; the 
other three were drugs, pesticides, and industrial  organic chemicals. 
Twenty  other  lines rated  product  patents  between five and six. Of those 
with more than two responses, almost all fell neatly into chemical 
products (including  inorganic chemicals, plastic materials, synthetic 
fibers,  synthetic  rubber,  and  glass) or relatively  uncomplicated  mechan- 
ical equipment  (air  and gas compressors,  power-driven  hand  tools, and 
oilfield  machinery).  The  only  anomalies  were  roasted  coffee and  products 
of steel rolling  and  finishing  mills. 
Table  2 shows additional  industry-level  detail-the  mean  rating  given 
for the effectiveness of patents in preventing  duplication  in eighteen 
industries  with ten or more respondents. These industries  tend to be 
much  more research-intensive  than  the sample  average, yet the pattern 
of interindustry  variation  was similar  to that in the full sample. Except 
for petroleum  refining,  product  patents  were considered  more  effective 
than process patents. Only four chemical industries (drugs, plastic 
materials,  inorganic  chemicals, and organic  chemicals) and petroleum 
refining  rated  process patent  effectiveness higher  than  four on a seven- 
point scale, and  only these four  chemical  industries  and steel mills  rated 
product  patents  higher  than  five.27 
The data on these eighteen most heavily sampled  industries  help to 
establish  the robustness  of our  conclusion  about  the limited  effectiveness 
of patents as a means of appropriation.  In none did a majority of 
respondents rate patents-either  to prevent duplication  or to secure 
royalty income-as  more effective than the most highly rated of the 
other  four  means  of appropriating  returns  from  new processes, although 
in drugs  and petroleum  refining  a majority  regarded  process patents as 
at least the equal  of the most effective alternative  mechanism  of appro- 
priation.  In only one industry,  drugs,  were product  patents  regarded  by 
a majority  of respondents  as strictly  more  effective than  other means  of 
appropriation.28  In three others-organic chemicals, plastic materials, 
27. The same pattern  appears  when the survey data are aggregated  up to the level 
(roughly  two and  one-half  digit)  at which  the  National  Science  Foundation  reports  detailed 
data on the extent and composition  of research  and development  expenditures.  Of the 
twenty-five  industries  into which the manufacturing  sector is divided, only industrial 
chemicals,  drugs, and petroleum  refining  rated  process patents  higher  than  four points, 
and  only industrial  chemicals  and  drugs  rated  product  patents  higher  than  five. 
28. Our  results  were reinforced  by Edwin  Mansfield's  finding  that  among  the twelve 
broadly  defined  industries  he studied  only in the drug  industry  were patents  considered R.  C. Levin, A.  K. Klevorick, R. R. Nelson,  and S.  G.  Winter  797 
Table 2.  Effectiveness of Process and Product Patents in Industries with Ten or More 
Survey Responses 
Process patents  Prodluct  patents 
Standard  Standard 
Industry  Mean  error  Mean  error 
Pulp, paper,  and paperboard  2.6  0.3  3.3  0.4 
Cosmetics  2.9  0.3  4.1  0.4 
Inorganic  chemicals  4.6  0.4  5.2  0.3 
Organic  chemicals  4.1  0.3  6.1  0.2 
Drugs  4.9  0.3  6.5  0.1 
Plastic materials  4.6  0.3  5.4  0.3 
Plastic products  3.2  0.3  4.9  0.3 
Petroleum  refining  4.9  0.4  4.3  0.4 
Steel mill products  3.5  0.7  5.1  0.6 
Pumps  and pumping  equipment  3.2  0.4  4.4  0.5 
Motors,  generators,  and controls  2.7  0.3  3.5  0.5 
Computers  3.3  0.4  3.4  0.4 
Communications  equipment  3.1  0.3  3.6  0.3 
Semiconductors  3.2  0.4  4.5  0.4 
Motor  vehicle parts  3.7  0.4  4.5  0.4 
Aircraft  and parts  3.1  0.5  3.8  0.4 
Measuring  devices  3.6  0.3  3.9  0.3 
Medical  instruments  3.2  0.4  4.7  0.4 
Full sample  3.5  0.06  4.3  0.07 
Source:  Authors' calculations.  Mean score  on a scale  of  I to 7. 
and steel mill products-most  respondents rated patents as no less 
effective than  the best alternative. 
The  exclusion  from  our  sample  of firms  that  offered  no publicly  traded 
securities  may have biased our findings.  For small, start-up  ventures, 
patents may be a relatively effective means of appropriating  R&D 
returns, in part because some other means, such as investment in 
complementary  sales and service efforts, may not be feasible. The 
patents  held by a small, technologically  oriented  firm  may be its most 
marketable  asset. Although  our respondents  were asked to describe  the 
typical experience of firms in their industries, they may well have 
overlooked  aspects of appropriability  that are particularly  relevant  for 
new firms. 
essential to developing  and marketing  most inventions. Chemicals  was the only other 
industry  that considered  patents  essential for as many as 30 percent  of inventions.  See 
"Patents  and  Innovation:  An Empirical  Study,"  Management  Science, vol. 32 (February 
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The most probable  explanation  for the robust  finding  that  patents  are 
particularly  effective in chemical  industries  is that comparatively  clear 
standards  can be applied  to assess a chemical patent's validity and to 
defend against infringement.  The uniqueness of a specific molecule is 
more easily demonstrated  than the novelty of, for example, a new 
component  of a complex  electrical  or mechanical  system. Similarly,  it is 
easy to determine  whether  an allegedly  infringing  molecule  is physically 
identical  to a patented  molecule;  it is more  difficult  to determine  whether 
comparable  components  of two complex systems "do the same work  in 
substantially  the same  way." To the extent that  very simple  mechanical 
inventions  approximate  molecules in their  discreteness  and easy differ- 
entiability,  it is understandable  that  industries  producing  such  machinery 
rank  just after chemical industries in the perceived effectiveness of 
patent  protection. 
The perceived  ineffectiveness  of patents  in most industries  raises the 
question of why firms  use them. Further  work is needed here, but we 
offer  some  speculations  informed  by the  comments  of ourpretest  subjects 
and by several survey respondents  at a conference we held to report 
preliminary  findings.  These executives identified  two motives for pat- 
enting that have little connection with appropriating  returns  from in- 
vestment. One  is to measure  the performance  of R&D  employees, which 
is a significant  problem  because these workers  are typically  engaged  in 
team production.  Legal standards  for identifying  inventors  on a patent 
application  are, however, reasonably  rigorous.  The second motive is to 
gain access  to certain foreign markets. Some developing countries 
require,  as a condition  of entry, that U.S. firms  license technology to a 
host-country  firm, and some patents are filed primarily  to permit such 
licensing.29 
29. Yet another  motive discussed in the literature  is to gain strategic  advantage  in 
negotiation.  In the semiconductor  industry,  for instance, the cumulative  nature  of the 
technology  makes  it difficult  to participate  legally  without  access to the  patents  of numerous 
firms.  In consequence,  there  is widespread  cross-licensing.  Established  firms,  however, 
rarely  license a new entrant  until  it has established  a significant  position  in the market.  As 
a defense  against  infringement  suits, a prudent  new entrant  will establish  a patent  portfolio 
of its own, thus compelling  established  firms  to negotiate  cross-license  agreements.  See 
Eric von Hippel, "Appropriability  of Innovation  Benefit  as a Predictor  of the Source of 
Innovation,"  Research  Policy, vol. 11  (January  1982),  pp. 95-115;  and  Levin, "Semicon- 
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Conditions  Affecting Appropriability 
Thus far we have focused on the overall strength  of various mecha- 
nisms of appropriation  and on interindustry  variations  in the effective- 
ness of patents. The patterns  of covariation  in the responses, however, 
suggested that interindustry  differences in conditions affecting appro- 
priability  might  be summarized  by a limited  number  of factors.  Moreover, 
the clear indications  that patents are effective in only a few industries 
suggested that it might be fruitful  to classify industries into clusters 
distinguishable  by a primary  means  of appropriation  and  perhaps  by the 
overall  ease of appropriating  returns.  Such clusters could prove useful 
in examining  links between appropriability  conditions  and measures  of 
R&D, innovation,  and  productivity  growth. 
Correlations  among responses to questions on the effectiveness of 
alternative  means  of appropriation  revealed  some interesting  patterns.30 
When patents effectively prevent competitors from duplicating  pro- 
cesses and products, they tend also to be effective in securing  royalty 
income. But neither  form of effectiveness was strongly  correlated  with 
the effectiveness of other means of appropriation.  For processes, there 
was a strong connection among three other mechanisms: lead time, 
learning  curve advantages, and secrecy. For products, superior  sales 
and service efforts were strongly linked to lead time and learning 
advantages,  though  not to secrecy. 
The  correlations  suggested  that  the mechanisms  of appropriation  may 
be reduced  to two dimensions:  one associated with the use of patents, 
the other related  to secrecy, lead time, and learning  curve advantages. 
For product  innovations, sales and service efforts may be involved in 
the second of these dimensions. We investigated this possibility by 
reducing  the data to principal  components  and employing  a variety of 
factor-analytic  techniques.  Principal  factor  analysis  and  several  methods 
30. Simple  correlation  coefficients  were calculated  using the individual  respondent 
and industry  mean responses  as the units of observation.  Correlations  among  industry 
means  for the entire sample  of 130 lines of business were qualitatively  similar  to those 
obtained  when  the sample  was restricted  to those with more than  two responses. These 
and  other  correlation  matrices  discussed  in this paper  are  available  from  the authors  upon 
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Table 3.  Principal Components Analysis of Methods of Appropriation 
Processes  and produicts  Processes  and products 
separately  together 
Coefficients  Coefficients  Coefficients  Coefficients 
of 1st  of 2d  of 1st  of 2d 
principal  principal  principal  principal 
Method  of appropriation  component  component  component  component 
New Processes 
Patents to prevent  duplication  .04  .86  .01  .73 
Patents  to secure royalties  .12  .86  .08  .78 
Secrecy  .59  -  .12  .54  .04 
Lead  time  .84  -.09  .79  -.04 
Moving down the learning curve  .84  -  .05  .80  -  .04 
Sales  and service  efforts  .51  .11  .45  -.06 
Cumulative  variance  explained  .34  .59  n.a.  n.a. 
New Products 
Patents  to prevent  duplication  .06  .87  .06  .73 
Patents to secure royalties  .06  .87  .07  .80 
Secrecy  .51  .01  .51  .06 
Lead time  .84  .00  .79  -.03 
Moving  down  the learning  curve  .84  -  .07  .82  -  .04 
Sales  and service  efforts  .69  -.09  .62  -.11 
Cumulative  variance  explained  .36  .61  .31  .50 
Source:  Authors' calculations. 
of rotation did little to alter the picture presented by the principal 
components,  which  are shown  in table  3.31 
The first  two columns  of the table show the weights associated with 
the first two principal  components when the six questions relating  to 
process appropriability  are analyzed separately  from the six questions 
relating  to product appropriability.  The next two columns report the 
results of a principal  components analysis on the entire set of twelve 
questions. With both approaches, the first principal  component gives 
near-zero  weight  to the two patent-related  methods  of appropriation  and 
heavy weight to the other mechanisms.  The weighting  is reversed for 
the second  principal  component.  Thus  the  first  two principal  components 
(and,  in the factor  analysis, the first  two factors)  are readily  interpreted, 
respectively, as nonpatent-  and patent-related  dimensions  of appropri- 
ability. Despite this clear interpretation,  the data do not reduce very 
31. The results reported  in table 3 are based on a principal  components  analysis 
undertaken  at the level of individual  responses.  An analysis  at the level of industry  mean 
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Table 4.  Cluster Analysis of Mechanisms of Appropriation 
Cluster 
Method  of appropriation  1  2  3 
New Processes 
Number  of industries  38  67  25 
Mean score 
Patents  to prevent  duplication  3.1  3.0  4.7 
Patents  to secure royalties  2.9  2.9  4.8 
Secrecy  2.8  4.6  4.7 
Lead time  4.2  5.4  5.6 
Learning  curves  4.3  5.3  5.1 
Superior  sales or service  4.7  4.5  4.9 
New Products 
Number  of industries  20  68  42 
Mean score 
Patents  to prevent  duplication  3.1  3.8  5.3 
Patents  to secure royalties  3.2  3.1  5.0 
Secrecy  2.6  3.5  4.0 
Lead time  4.0  5.6  5.7 
Learning  curves  4.2  5.3  5.2 
Superior  sales or service  5.2  5.7  5.6 
Source:  Authors' calculations. 
satisfactorily  to just two dimensions. As table 3 indicates, when the 
process and product questions are analyzed separately, the first two 
components  explain  only 60 percent  of the variance  in the responses to 
six questions, and when the two sets of questions are combined, two 
components  explain  only 50 percent  of the variance. 
Our  interpretation  that the means of appropriation  can be grouped 
into  patent  and nonpatent  mechanisms  was nonetheless  reinforced  by a 
cluster analysis that classified industries  according  to mean responses 
to the relevant  questions. The best clustering  results were achieved by 
dividing  the industries  into three  groups,  as shown in table  4. Industries 
assigned to  cluster 1 tended to  have relatively low  scores for all 
mechanisms  of appropriation.  Sales and service effort was the most 
highly  rated  mechanism  and  was, in  fact, regarded  as reasonably  effective 
in  capturing  returns  from  new products.  Industries  in cluster  2 rated  lead 
time  and  learning  curves  as relatively  effective, but  not patents. Secrecy 
was important  in appropriating  process returns, and sales and service 
efforts  complemented  lead time and learning  advantages  for products. 
Only  for cluster  3 were product  and process patents deemed effective, 802  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  3:1987 
but still the effectiveness of lead time and  learning  was no lower than  for 
the industries  in cluster 2. Those few industries  in which patents were 
rated as more effective than other mechanisms were all in the third 
cluster. 
The cluster  analysis  suggested  that  there  was a group  of industries  in 
which no appropriation  mechanism  was particularly  effective. As an 
alternative  approach  to identifying  settings  with low appropriability,  we 
considered  the maximum  score an industry  assigned to any of the six 
mechanisms  on the questionnaire.  Only 11 of the 130 failed to rate at 
least one means  of appropriating  returns  from  product  innovation  higher 
than  five on the seven-point  scale. The industries  in this  group  with more 
than two responses were all drawn  from the food products  and metal- 
working  sectors: milk, meat products, iron and steel foundries, boiler 
shops, and screw machine products (nuts, bolts, and screws). Many 
more industries (34 of 130) rated no means of appropriating  process 
returns  higher  than  five. This group  contained  all the industries  (except 
milk) that ranked  low on product  appropriability  but was otherwise a 
diverse lot. The heaviest concentration  was in fabricated  metals and 
machinery. But several chemical industries were also represented, 
including  the three industries  in which product  patents were viewed as 
most effective-organic chemicals,  pesticides, and drugs. 
The urge  to find  patterns  in the data  should  not be carried  too far. The 
associations among  mechanisms  of appropriation  revealed by the cor- 
relation,  principal  components,  and  cluster  analyses are suggestive, but 
there is substantial  heterogeneity  in the underlying  data. As noted, the 
first  two principal  components,  though  readily  interpretable,  explained 
an unsatisfactory  fraction  of the overall  variance.  A similar  lack of good 
fit characterized  the cluster  analyses of process and product  appropria- 
bility. Despite the fairly  clear interpretation  that could be given to each 
cluster, the variance  within  the clusters was almost twice that between 
clusters. 
Limitations on Effectiveness  of Patents 
To understand  why patent  protection  might  be weak in some indus- 
tries, we asked  respondents  to rate  the importance  of possible  limitations 
on patent  effectiveness. Table  5 summarizes  the responses. The ability R.  C. Levin, A.  K. Klevorick, R. R. Nelson,  and S.  G.  Winter  803 
Table 5.  Limitations on Effectiveness of Patents for New or Improved Processes 
and Productsa 
Distribution  of 
Overall sample  means  industry meansb 
Limitation  Processes  Products  Processes  Products 
New processes or products  4.32  3.75  3.6-5.4c  2.8-4.8 
patentable  (0.07)  (0.07) 
Patents  unlikely  to be valid if  4.18  3.92  3.5_5.Oc  3.05. 0c 
challenged  (0.06)  (0.07) 
Firms  do not enforce patents  4.29  3.84  3.5_5.0c  3.0-4.8c 
(0.06)  (0.07) 
Competitors  legally  "invent  5.49  5.09  4.9-6.0  4.4-5.9d 
around"  patents  (0.05)  (0.06) 
Technology  moving so fast that  3.40  3.34  2.0-4.3d  2.0-4.0d 
patents  are irrelevant  (0.07)  (0.07) 
Patent  documents  disclose too  4.19  3.65  3.2-5.0  2.8-4.5c 
much information  (0.07)  (0.07) 
Licensing  required  by court  2.96  2.79  2.0-3.8  2.0-3.3 
decisions  (0.06)  (0.06) 
Firms participate in cross-licensing  3.08  2.93  2.2-3.9d  2.1-3.9d 
agreements  with competitors  (0.06)  (0.06) 
Source:  Authors' calculations. 
a.  Range:  1 =  not an important limitation; 7  very important limitation. Standard errors in parentheses. 
b.  From the upper bound of the lowest  quintile of industries to the lower bound of the highest  quintile. 
c.  Interindustry differences  significant at the .10 level. 
d.  Interindustry differences  significant at the  .01 level. 
of competitors  to "invent around" both process and product patents 
was rated higher  than five on a seven-point scale of importance  by 60 
percent of the responding  industries. Only one other constraint-the 
lack of ready  patentability  for new processes-was  rated  this important 
by more  than  20 percent. Limitations  on patents  were generally  consid- 
ered  more  severe for processes than  for products,  which  was consistent 
with our finding  that product patents tend to be more effective than 
process  patents.  In particular,  the lack  of patentability  was more  serious 
for  processes  than  for  products,  and  so was the disclosure  of information 
through  patent  documents.32 
32. Additional  evidence  of the internal  consistency  of the survey  results  was provided 
by the  pattern  of negative  correlation  between  responses  concerning  limitations  on patent 
effectiveness  and  responses  concerning  the  effectiveness  of patents.  Using  either  individual 
respondents  or industry  means  as the unit  of observation,  all such correlation  coefficients 
were  negative  except  in  the  case  of compulsory  licensing.  Most  correlations  were  significant 
at the .01  level. 804  Brookings Papers  on  Economic  Activity,  3.1987 
The responses concerning  limits on patent  effectiveness may illumi- 
nate  and  focus policy discussion. In recent years there  has been consid- 
erable  interest  in making  patent  protection  more  effective. One  initiative 
has been to make the legal requirements  for a valid patent claim less 
stringent.33  Another has been to vacate court decrees that compel 
licensing.  Our  data  identified  industries  in which stringent  requirements 
for patent  validity  or compulsory  licensing  were perceived  as important 
limitations  on the usefulness  of patents  in appropriating  returns. 
Respondents  from twenty-two lines of business, mostly in the food 
processing  and  fabricated  metals sectors, considered  the likely inability 
to withstand  challenges  to validity  as significantly  limiting  the effective- 
ness of process patents (scoring the importance  higher  than five on a 
seven-point scale); for fourteen of these industries  the mean response 
was six or higher  on the scale. This group  and the nineteen industries 
citing invalidity  as a constraint  on the effectiveness of product  patents 
(again assigning a score higher than five) overlapped considerably. 
Further  investigation  would  be required  to determinejust  why these two 
sectors appear to have difficulty establishing valid claims. Perhaps 
because they are mature industries, opportunities  may be limited or 
novelty may be difficult  to achieve or simply  difficult  to prove. 
Compulsory  licensing was rarely  judged a significant  limit on the 
effectiveness of patents. Only one industry  with one respondent  rated 
this constraint  higher  than five on the scale for products, and only six 
cited compulsory  licensing  of process patents as of comparable  impor- 
tance. Two of these industries  were not singletons-metal  containers 
and electron tubes. Compulsory  licensing  decrees were thus perceived 
as important  in only a small subset of the industries  that F. M. Scherer 
indicated  were subject  to such decrees.34  The overall  lack  of impact  from 
compulsory  licensing  requirements  was consistent  with  Scherer'  s finding 
that  they did not discourage  R&D spending. 
33. For  example,  P.L. 98-622, passed  in 1984,  modified  the previous  requirement  that 
each coinventor  listed  in a patent  application  also had  to be a coinventor  on every claim  of 
the patent.  The new law allows  inventors  to apply  jointly, even though  they may  not have 
physically  worked  together,  made  the same  level of contribution,  or contributed  individ- 
ually to the subject  matter  of each claim. For a thorough  discussion, see Patrick  Kelley, 
"Recent Changes  in the Patent  Law Which  Affect Inventorship  and the Ownership  of 
Patents,"  unpublished  manuscript  (1985). 
34.  F. M. Scherer, The Economic Effects of Coinpllsoty  Patent Licensing (New York 
University,  Graduate  School of Business  Administration,  1977). R.  C. Levin, A.  K. Klevorick, R. R. Nelson,  and S.  G.  Winter  805 
The choice between obtaining  a patent  and maintaining  secrecy may 
be influenced  by the extent to which the disclosures  made  in the patent 
document  facilitate  inventing  around  the  patent.  Our  data  provided  some 
support for this theory. The effectiveness of secrecy was positively 
correlated  with the extent to which  disclosures  limited  the effectiveness 
of patents. The link was stronger  for product  patents than for process 
patents. But patent disclosures represented  a substantial  limitation  on 
the effectiveness of product patents for only 4 of the 130 industries 
(scoring as high as six on the scale), and only 16 regarded  process 
disclosures as comparably  important.  In only one line of business of 
those with five or more  respondents-metal cutting  machine  tools-did 
disclosures  constrain  so substantially  the effectiveness of both process 
and  product  patents. 
Channels of Information Spillover 
To the extent that a rival can learn easily about an innovator's 
technology, the incentive to invest in R&D is attenuated. But to the 
extent that learning  is easy, wasteful duplication  or near duplication  of 
R&D effort by rival firms may be avoided. Also,  knowledge of an 
innovator's new technology may complement rival R&D effort by 
enhancing  its productivity.  Richard  Nelson and  Sidney Winter,  Michael 
Spence, and Richard  Levin and Peter C. Reiss have developed models 
that begin to disentangle  these offsetting  effects, called by Spence the 
incentive and efficiency effects of interfirm  spillovers.35  A  sharper 
characterization  of interindustry  differences  in the nature  and strength 
of the mechanisms  by which firms  learn  about their competitors'  tech- 
nology  should  advance  these modeling  efforts. 
Table  6 summarizes  the responses  to questions  about  the  effectiveness 
of alternative  ways of learning.  There is little difference  between the 
pattern  of responses  for processes and  for products,  except that, as one 
would  expect, reverse  engineering  is markedly  more  effective in yielding 
35.  Richard R. Nelson  and Sidney G. Winter, "The Schumpeterian Tradeoff Revis- 
ited," American Economic  Review,  vol.  72 (March 1982), pp.  114-32; Michael Spence, 
"Cost  Reduction,  Competition,  and  Industry  Performance,"  Econometrica,  vol.  52 
(January 1984), pp. 101-21; and Levin and Reiss,  "Tests of a Schumpeterian Model,"  and 
"Demand-Creating and Cost-Reducing R&D." 806  Brookings  Paper  s  on  Economic  Activity,  3:1987 
Table 6.  Effectiveness of Alternative Methods of Learning about New Processes 
and Productsa 
Distribution of 
Overall sample  means  industry rneansb 
Method  of learning  Processes  Products  Processes  Produicts 
Licensing  technology  4.58  4.62  3.4_5.6c  3.5_5.5c 
(0.07)  (0.07) 
Patent disclosures  3.88  4.01  3.0-4.6c  3.0-4.8c 
(0.05)  (0.06) 
Publications  or technical  meetings  4.07  4.07  3.4-4.7  3.3_4.6d 
(0.05)  (0.05) 
Conversations  with employees  of  3.64  3.64  2.9-4.7d  2.9_4.5d 
innovating firm  (0.06)  (0.06) 
Hiring R&D employees  from  4.02  4.08  2.7-5.0c  2.8-5.0c 
innovating firm  (0.07)  (0.07) 
Reverse  engineering of product  4.07  4.83  3.0-5.0c  4.0_5.7d 
(0.07)  (0.06) 
Independent  R&D  4.76  5.00  4.0-5.5  4.4-5.6c 
(0.06)  (0.05) 
Source:  Authors'  calculations. 
a.  Range:  I  =  not at all effective;  7  =  very effective.  Standard errors in parentheses. 
b.  From the upper bound of the lowest  quintile of industries to the lower bound of the highest quintile. 
c.  Interindustry differences  in means significant at the  .01 level. 
d.  Interindustry differences  in means significant at the  .05 level. 
information  about product  technology. On average, independent  R&D 
was rated as the most effective means of learning  about rival technol- 
ogy. 36  This may appear  to be wasteful duplication,  but it need not be. 
One pretest subject  said that  R&D  effort  devoted to determining  what a 
competitor  has done may have strong  complementarities  with a firm's 
own research  program  in areas not directly  imitative  of the innovating 
competitor.  Licensing  was also rated, on average, an important  way of 
gaining  access to a rival's  new technology. 
The correlations  among  individual  and  industry  mean  responses  show 
that mechanisms  relying  on interpersonal  communication  (publications 
and technical meetings, informal  conversations, and hiring  away em- 
ployees) are strongly  intercorrelated.  Learning  through  licensing tech- 
nology  is uncorrelated  with nearly  all other  learning  mechanisms  except 
disclosure  through  patent documents. There are two possible interpre- 
36. Wesley  Cohen  and  Daniel  Levinthal  have studied  the incentives  to engage  in R&D 
that  is directed  toward  developing  absorptive  capacity,  the  ability  to make  use of  technology 
developed  by others.  See "Innovation  and  Learning:  The  Two Faces of R&D"  (Carnegie- 
Mellon  University,  Department  of Social  and  Decision Sciences, March  1987). R.  C. Levin, A.  K. Klevorick, R. R. Nelson,  and S.  G.  Winter  807 
tations of this last connection. Potential  licensees may learn about the 
opportunity  to license through  patent  documents,  or the documents  may 
prove  useful  in employing  new technology  once it is licensed. We cannot 
tell whether  the "announcement"  effect or the "complementary  infor- 
mation"  effect of disclosures  predominates.7 
The pattern  of correlation  suggested  that  there  might  be three or four 
clusters of industries,  distinguished  in turn  by an emphasis  on learning 
through  licensing, interpersonal  channels, and reverse engineering  or 
independent  R&D, or both. The results obtained  from cluster analysis 
were not  entirely  satisfactory.38  Nonetheless, table  7 presents  the results 
of grouping  the lines of business into three clusters on the basis of 
responses  to the questions  on channels  of spillover. 
For both new processes and  products,  the largest  group  of industries 
typically relied on licensing and independent R&D to  learn about 
competitive technology. Interpersonal  channels were relatively unim- 
portant,  and reverse engineering  was important  for products. For both 
processes and  products,  there  was a second cluster  of industries  in  which 
interpersonal  channels  of spillover  were most important.  In the case of 
learning  about new products, only ten industries  were classified  in this 
cluster,  and  in  the case of learning  about  new  processes, other  channels- 
independent  R&D and reverse engineering-were nearly as valuable. 
For  processes, a third  cluster  appeared  to find  all mechanisms  of learning 
relatively  unproductive.  For products  this group  found all mechanisms 
moderately  effective. 
Cost and Time Required for Imitation 
As part  of our  investigation  we asked respondents  to estimate  typical 
costs and  time required  to duplicate  several categories  of innovations  if 
37. The  correlations  between  the effectiveness  of particular  learning  mechanisms  and 
the effectiveness  of alternative  methods of appropriation  are interesting  and internally 
consistent.  In particular,  when patent  protection  is effective, learning  tends  to take place 
primarily  through  licensing  and  patent  disclosures.  The effectiveness  of patents  is essen- 
tially uncorrelated  with the effectiveness of interpersonal  channels of learning  and of 
independent  R&D, and it is negatively correlated  with the effectiveness of reverse 
engineering. 
38. With  three  clusters  the ratio  of variance  among  clusters  to variance  within  clusters 
was low, but attempts  to find more than three clusters  were thwarted  by the persistent 
appearance  of clusters  containing  only one or two lines of business. 808  Brookinigs Papers  on Economic  Activity,  3:1987 
Table 7.  Cluster Analysis of Channels of Learning 
Cluster 
Learning  mechanism  1  2  3 
New  Processes 
Number of industries  68  43  19 
Mean score 
Licensing  technology  5.0  4.3  2.5 
Patent disclosures  4.0  4.0  3.2 
Publications or technical meetings  3.8  4.6  3.9 
Conversations with employees  of 
innovating firm  3.2  4.8  3.0 
Hiring R&D employees  from 
innovating firm  3.7  5.1  2.4 
Reverse  engineering of product  3.8  4.6  4.0 
Independent R&D  5.0  4.6  4.3 
New  products 
Number of industries  68  10  52 
Mean score 
Licensing  technology  4.7  2.5  4.5 
Patent disclosures  3.9  2.9  4.3 
Publications or technical meetings  3.7  5.1  4.3 
Conversations  with employees 
of innovating firm  3.0  4.6  4.5 
Hiring R&D employees  from 
innovating firm  3.2  4.4  4.9 
Reverse  engineering of product  4.7  3.0  5.2 
Independent R&D  5.1  3.7  5.0 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
they were developed by a competitor.  For each category, respondents 
were asked to identify (within a range) the cost of duplication as a 
percentage  of the innovator's  R&D cost. Intervals  measured  in months 
or years  were used to classify the time required.  In light  of evidence that 
there  is a time-cost  trade-off  in certain  industries,  we asked  respondents 
to estimate  the cost and time required  "to have a significant  impact  on 
the market."  39 
Tables 8 and 9 show frequency distributions  of industry median 
responses.40  The dispersion of industry medians suggests substantial 
variations  among  industries  in  both  the  cost and  time  required  to duplicate 
39.  See  Edwin  Mansfield,  Industrial  Research  and  Technological  Innovation:  An 
Econometric  Analysis  (Norton, 1968),  for evidence  on the time-cost  trade-off. 
40. Qualitatively  identical  results and interpretations  are obtained  from frequency 
distributions  of individual  responses  and  from  the distribution  of industry  means. R.  C. Levin, A.  K. Klevorick, R. R. Nelson,  and S.  G.  Winter  809 
Table 8.  Cost of Duplicating an Innovation as a Percentage of Innovator's R&D Cost, 
Frequency Distribution of Median Responses 
More  Timely 
Less  than  26 to 50  51 to 75  76 to 100  thani 100  dluplicationt 
Type of inniovationt  25 percenit  percent  percenit  percentt  percent  niot  possible 
New  process 
Major patented new 
process  1  5  19  66  26  10 
Major unpatented new 
process  5  10  55  49  6  2 
Typical patented new 
process  2  15  61  41  6  2 
Typical unpatented new 
process  8  43  58  14  4  0 
New  product 
Major patented new 
product  1  4  17  63  30  12 
Major unpatented new 
product  5  13  58  40  7  4 
Typical patented new 
product  2  18  64  32  9  2 
Typical unpatented new 
product  9  58  40  15  5  0 
Source:  Survey  of 127  lines of business. 
all categories of innovation. If, however, individual  responses to the 
questions  on cost are  coded  on a six-point  interval  scale, there  is sufficient 
intraindustry  variation  to render  interindustry  differences  insignificant 
at the 0.01 level. Interindustry  differences in the time required for 
duplication  are, by contrast,  significant  at the 0.01 level in every instance 
except the time required  to duplicate  a typical  patented  new process. 
Several  conclusions  are  apparent.  First,  duplicating  majorinnovations 
tends  to cost more  and  take longer  than  duplicating  typical  innovations. 
(In a sense, this confirms that respondents correctly interpreted  the 
distinction  between  typical  and major  innovations.)  Second, for a given 
category of innovation, the cost and time required to duplicate are 
distributed  very similarly  for products  and processes. Products  tend to 
be slightly  cheaper  and quicker  to duplicate  than  processes, though  this 
generalization  does not hold for major  patented innovations. Finally, 
patents tend to raise imitation costs and time for each category of 
innovation.  These increases  can be regarded  as alternative  indicators  of 
the relative  effectiveness  of patents  in different  industries. 
To explore this point further,  we coded the individual  responses to 
the imitation  costs and time questions on a six-point interval scale, 810  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity, 3:1987 
Table 9.  time  Required to Duplicate an Innovation, Frequency Distribution 
of Median Responses 
Less  Timely 
than 6  6 months  I to 3  3 to 5  More thzant dluplicationt 
Type of innovation  months  to I year  years  years  5 years  not possible 
New  process 
Major patented new 
process  0  4  72  37  9  7 
Major unpatented new 
process  2  20  84  17  2  4 
Typical patented new 
process  0  40  73  13  0  3 
Typical unpatented new 
process  8  66  47  6  1  1 
New  product 
Major patented new 
product  2  6  64  40  8  9 
Major unpatented new 
product  3  22  89  12  1  2 
Typical  patented new 
product  5  39  72  6  4  3 
Typical unpatented new 
product  18  67  39  4  1  0 
Source:  Survey of  129 lines of business. 
calculated  the individual  and industry  mean  increases in costs and time 
associated with the presence of patents, and correlated  these, respec- 
tively, with individual  and  industry  mean  responses to our questions  on 
the effectiveness  of patents  in preventing  duplication.  For  each category 
of innovation, the reported effectiveness of patents was positively 
correlated  with the increase in duplication  costs and time associated 
with  patents,  although  the  correlations  tended  to be stronger  for  products 
than for processes. We also found some evidence, at the level of the 
individual  respondent,  that  patent  effectiveness was associated  with the 
absolute  level of duplication  costs for patented  processes and  products. 
We found a much stronger association, however, between reported 
patent effectiveness and the amount  of time required  to duplicate  both 
patented  process and  product  innovations. 
These broad-brush  patterns of association conceal some striking 
anomalies. For particular  categories of innovation, at least two and as 
many as fourteen  industries  reported  that patents actually  reduced  the 
costs or time required  for duplication.  A partial  explanation  is that a 
disproportionate  number  of these industries  also reported  that  disclosure R.  C. Levin, A. K. Klevor-ick, R. R. Nelso,i,  anid S.  G.  Winter  811 
of information  through  patent  documents  was a significant  limitation  on 
patent  effectiveness. 
A second anomaly  is that, despite the positive correlation  between 
patent effectiveness and the costs of imitating  patented products, in 
several industries  patents were relatively ineffective and duplication 
costs were nonetheless very high, whether or not the innovation  was 
patented. Among these were guided missiles and several types of 
industrial  machinery  (food products  machinery,  electric welding  appa- 
ratus, and speed changers, drives, and gears). In these instances the 
relative complexity of the products presumably  makes reverse engi- 
neering  inherently  costly despite relatively  weak patent  protection. 
It  is interesting  to compare  our  findings  with  those of Edwin  Mansfield, 
Mark  Schwartz,  and  Samuel  Wagner,  who studied  the effects of patents 
on imitation  costs in three industries.41  They concluded that patents 
generally raised imitation  costs by 30 percentage points in drugs, 20 
points in chemicals, and 7 points in electronics. To render our data 
comparable,  we evaluated  each respondent's  answer  at the mean  of the 
relevant  range  and computed  crude  industry  average  imitation  costs for 
each type of innovation.42  Our results were consistent with those of 
Mansfield,  Schwartz,  and  Wagner.  We  found  that  patents  raise  imitation 
costs by 40 percentage  points for both major  and typical new drugs, by 
30 points  for major  new chemical  products,  and by 25 points  for typical 
chemical products. In electronics, our results differed somewhat for 
semiconductors,  computers, and communications  equipment,  but the 
range  was 7 to 15 percentage  points for major  products  and 7 to 10 for 
typical  products.43 
41. Mansfield,  Schwartz,  and  Wagner,  "Imitation  Costs and  Patents." 
42. The  ranges  are  shown  in  the  headings  of table  8. The  fifth  and  sixth  column  headings 
are not readily  quantified.  To permit  the comparison  discussed in the text, we assigned 
these categories  the values of 112.5 percent and 137.5 percent, respectively, thereby 
maintaining  a constant  spacing  of 25 percentage  points  between  each pair  of categories. 
43. Our  results  on the time required  to duplicate  a rival's new products  or processes 
were  also roughly  consistent  with  recent  findings  of Edwin  Mansfield.  In all but  one of the 
ten industries  he surveyed, the median  respondent  indicated  that six to twelve months 
usually  elapsed  before  the nature  and  operation  of a new product  were known  to a firm's 
rivals.  Effective  duplication,  as we have  defined  it, should  take  as long  or  longer,  and  table 
9 shows  that  it typically  does. The median  and  modal  industries  require  one to three  years 
to duplicate  a major  innovation  or a typical patented  innovation.  A typical unpatented 
innovation,  however, is more often duplicated  within six to twelve months. See "How 
Rapidly  Does New Industrial  Technology  Leak Out?"  Jolurnal of Industrial  Economics, 
vol. 34 (December  1985),  pp. 217-24. 812  Brookings Paper-s on Economic  Activity,  3.1987 
Although  the costs and  time  required  for duplication  are  related  to the 
effectiveness of patents, they do not seem to be linked strongly  to any 
other mechanism  of appropriability.  In particular,  most imitation  time 
and cost measures  are uncorrelated  with lead time and learning  curve 
advantages,  and where such correlations  are statistically  significant  (at 
the level of the individual  respondent), the correlation  coefficient is 
invariably  below .15. These results make  sense. Lead time and  learning 
advantages  may permit  appropriation  of returns  even when duplication 
is relatively  quick  and  inexpensive. Effective  patents,  however,  presum- 
ably require  considerable  time and  expense to be invented  around. 
Finally, most of our respondents believed only a few firms were 
capable  of duplicating  new processes and products.  As table 10 shows, 
the median  and modal  number  of firms  judged capable  of duplicating  a 
major  process or product  innovation  was three to five. The median  and 
modal number of firms regarded  as capable of duplicating  a typical 
process or product  innovation  was six to ten. The data  revealed  only the 
slightest tendency toward  a smaller  number  of capable duplicators  for 
processes than  for products. 
R&D and Innovation 
In this section, we summarize  how data  derived  from  our  survey  have 
been employed  to understand  better  the sources of interindustry  differ- 
ences in R&D spending  and the rate of technological  advance. In the 
first  such effort  Richard  Levin, Wesley Cohen, and  David  Mowery  used 
several survey-based  measures to explain variations  in the published 
Federal  Trade Commission  data on industry-level  R&D spending  as a 
percentage  of sales.44  They also sought to explain interindustry  differ- 
ences in the rate at which new processes and new products were 
introduced  during  the 1970s, as reported  by our survey respondents.45 
44.  The ratio of company-financed R&D to sales (R&D intensity) varies considerably 
among industries defined at the FTC line-of-business  level of aggregation. In the 1976 data 
used  by  Levin,  Cohen,  and Mowery,  R&D intensity  ranged from 0.08  percent  to  8.5 
percent; both the mean and standard deviation were  1.7 percent.  See  "R&D Appropria- 
bility, Opportunity, and Market Structure." 
45.  Respondents  were asked to identify,  on a seven-point  Likert scale ranging from 
"very slowly"  to "very rapidly," the rate at which new processes  and products had been R.  C. Levin, A.  K. Klevorick, R. R. Nelson,  and S.  G.  Winter  813 
Table 10.  Number of Firms Capable of Duplicating an Innovation, Frequency 
Distribution of Median Responses 
More tliant 
Type of intntovation  None  I or 2  3 to 5  6 to 10  10 
Major new or improved process  2  32  75  18  2 
Typical new or improved process  1  7  41  58  22 
Major new or improved product  2  25  73  25  4 
Typical new or improved product  1  5  33  63  26 
Source:  Survey of  129 lines of business. 
In a subsequent  paper,  Cohen,  Levin, and  Mowery  studied  the extent to 
which  the same  survey-based  measures  explained  the powerful  industry 
effects in the confidential  FTC data  on R&D  intensity  at the level of the 
business  unit.46 
The first  paper  focused on the Schumpeterian  hypothesis that R&D 
intensity  and  innovation  rates are significantly  influenced  by the level of 
industry  concentration.  One common rationale  for this hypothesis is 
that industry  concentration  enhances the potential  for appropriation  of 
R&D returns.  A different  view is that, in the long run, concentration 
tends  to be a consequence  of industry  evolution  in a regime  of abundant 
technological  opportunity  and a high degree of uncertainty  associated 
with investment in R&D. Both perspectives suggest that there is no 
simple, causal relationship  between concentration  per se and R&D. 
Concentration  may be statistically  significant  in simple  regression  spec- 
ifications  because it reflects  the influence  of the unobserved  appropria- 
bility  and  opportunity  conditions  that  directly  affect R&D spending  and 
the rate  of innovation. 
In ordinary  least squares  and two-stage least squares specifications 
that included  only the four-firm  concentration  ratio and its square as 
introduced in their industries since  1970. Industry mean responses  were highly correlated 
with total factor productivity growth, and the plausibility of the responses  was reinforced 
by the identity of the highest and lowest  industries in the sample. Excluding  singletons, 
the lines of business  reporting the slowest  rates of product introduction were concrete, 
cement, boiler shops,  milk, gypsum,  primary copper, grain mill products, and sawmills. 
Those reporting the most rapid rates of product introduction were electrical equipment for 
internal combusion engines,  radio and TV sets,  computers,  semiconductors,  communi- 
cations  equipment,  photographic  equipment  and  supplies,  engineering  and  scientific 
instruments, and guided missiles. Levin, Cohen, and Mowery used as a dependent variable 
the average of each industry's reported rates of process and product introduction. 
46.  Cohen, Levin, and Mowery,  "Firm Size and R&D Intensity." 814  Br-ookinigs  Paper-s on  Economic  Activity,  3:1987 
regressors, Levin, Cohen, and Mowery replicated  with the industry- 
level FTC  data  the familiar  inverted-U  relationship  between concentra- 
tion and  R&D  intensity,  and  they found  a strong  relationship  of the same 
form between concentration  and the rate of innovation.47  Adding  two- 
digit  industry  fixed effects weakened  slightly  the effect of concentration 
on R&D, but the innovation-rate  equation  was unaffected. 
The results changed dramatically  with the addition  of measures of 
appropriability  and  technological  opportunity  derived  from  the survey.48 
Whether or not two-digit industry fixed effects were included, the 
coefficients  on concentration  and  its square  fell by an order  of magnitude 
in the R&D equation, and the effect of concentration  was no longer 
statistically  significant  at the .05 level in either  the R&D  intensity  or the 
innovation-rate  equation.  The vector of survey-based  opportunity  vari- 
ables was  significant at the  .05 level in all specifications, and the 
opportunity  and appropriability  variables  were jointly significant.  The 
appropriability  variables,  however, were not individually  significant  in 
the R&D  equation,  although  the rate  of innovation  was positively  related 
to the effectiveness of an industry's most effective means of appro- 
priation.49 
The  paper  by Cohen,  Levin, and  Mowery  used the disaggregated  FTC 
data at the level of the business unit to investigate the Schumpeterian 
hypothesis  linking  size and  R&D  intensity.  The authors  found  that  when 
either  fixed  industry  effects (at  the level of the line of business)  or survey- 
based industry  characteristics  were taken into account, firm  size had a 
very small and statistically  insignificant  effect on R&D intensity. The 
size of the business unit did have a significant  effect on the probability 
47.  All  coefficients  in  the  R&D  and  innovation-rate  equations  were  statistically 
significant at the .01 level. 
48.  To  represent  appropriability conditions,  Levin,  Cohen,  and Mowery  used  two 
survey-based  measures:  the  maximum  of  the  mean  scores  an industry's  respondents 
assigned to the effectiveness  of the six methods of appropriation and the time required to 
duplicate  effectively  a  patented  major product  innovation.  To  represent  opportunity 
conditions,  they used a measure of an industry's closeness  to science  as well as variables 
summarizing the importance of four other external sources of knowledge for an industry's 
technological  advance:  material suppliers,  equipment  suppliers,  users  of the industry's 
products, and government agencies and research labs. 
49.  It may  seem  anomalous  that the effectiveness  of  appropriation was  positively 
related to innovation but not to R&D, but the relationship was observed at the level of the 
industry.  Better  appropriability may discourage  R&D  directed  toward imitation to an 
extent that more than compensates  for its stimulus to innovative R&D. Such a reallocation 
of effort would be entirely  consistent  with the observed  positive  relationship  between 
appropriability and the rate of innovation. R.  C. Levin, A.  K. Klevorick, R. R. Nelson,  acnd  S.  G.  Winter  815 
of engaging  in R&D, but there was no perceptible  tendency for R&D 
intensity  to increase  with size within  the group  of R&D  performers.  Size 
effects, however, explained  only two-tenths  of 1  percent  of the variance 
in R&D intensity, while industry effects at the line-of-business  level 
explained  half  this variance. 
Cohen, Levin, and Mowery found that industry-level  measures of 
appropriability,  opportunity,  and demand  conditions  were consistently 
significant  in ordinary  least squares,  GLS, and  Tobit  regressions  explain- 
ing business unit  R&D intensity. Moreover,  these industry  characteris- 
tics explained approximately  half the variance in R&D intensity ex- 
plained  by fixed industry  effects. When  attention  was focused on those 
lines for which there  were at least three survey respondents,  measured 
industry  characteristics  explained 56 percent of the variation  in R&D 
intensity  among  industries.  Within  particular  two-digit  industries  (chem- 
icals, machinery,  and electrical equipment),  measured  characteristics 
explained  78 to 86 percent  of the variance  explained  by fixed effects. 
The results obtained  in the two papers indicated  that survey-based 
measures  can contribute  substantially  to an explanation  of interindustry 
differences in R&D intensity and innovative performance.  Measures 
derived from the survey, despite their imperfections, have also been 
found  useful  for various  other  purposes.50 
Remarks on Policy 
Our  findings  suggested some general principles  relevant to policies 
that  affect  the incentives  to engage  in innovative  activity. 
A first  principle  is that the patent system and related  institutions  to 
50.  Levin and Reiss have used survey-based  measures of appropriability and oppor- 
tunity in a simultaneous equation model of R&D spending and market structure that builds 
on their work in "Tests  of a Schumpeterian Model."  Cohen and Levinthal use  survey- 
based variables in their work on R&D as investment in absorptive capacity; see "Innova- 
tion and Learning."  lain Cockburn and Zvi Griliches are studying the usefulness  of our 
survey measures in estimating the value of patents from stock market data; see "Industry 
Effects  and Appropriability Measures  in  the  Stock  Market's  Valuation  of  R&D  and 
Patents," American Economic Review (forthcoming, May 1988). Meryl Finkel, "Overseas 
Research  and Development  by  U.S.  Multinationals:  Ownership  Structure  Decisions" 
(Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University,  1986), explored the effect of our appropriability 
variables on the investment  decisions  of multinational corporations.  Franco Malerba is 
using the survey data to explain interindustry differences  in the extent and effectiveness 
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protect intellectual  property  should be understood  as social structures 
that improve  the appropriability  of returns  from innovation. They are 
not the only nor necessarily the primary  barriers  that prevent general 
access to what  would  otherwise  be pure  public  goods. Lead  time  accrues 
naturally  to the innovator,  even in the absence of any deliberate  effort 
to enhance  its protective  effect. Secrecy, learning  advantages,  and  sales 
and  service  efforts  can  provide  additional  protection,  though  they  require 
the innovator's  deliberate  effort. The survey confirmed  that  these other 
means of appropriation  are typically more important  than the patent 
system. Hence in examining  a proposed  adjustment  of the patent  system 
or related  institutions,  it is important  to recognize that the incremental 
effect of the policy change  depends  on the protection  other  mechanisms 
provide. 
The survey  results  also confirmed  substantial  interindustry  variation 
in the level of appropriability  and in the mechanisms  that provide it. 
From this follows our second major  principle,  which is that the incre- 
mental  effects of policy changes  should  be assessed at the industry  level. 
For example,  in the aircraft  industry,  where other mechanisms  provide 
considerable  appropriability,  lengthening  the life of patents  would tend 
to have little  effect on incentives  for innovation.  In the drug  industry  the 
effect of a longer  lifetime  would matter  more."5 
Finally, improving the protection of  intellectual property is  not 
necessarily socially beneficial. Empirical  work has so far indicated a 
positive cross-sectional  relationship  between strong  appropriability,  as 
measured  by variables constructed from our survey, and innovative 
performance.  But the social cost-benefit  calculation  is not straightfor- 
ward. Stronger  appropriability  will not yield more innovation in all 
contexts and, where  it does, innovation  may come at excessive cost. 
To illustrate  how our survey results and general perspective might 
inform  policy discussion, consider  the 1987  proposal  (S. 438, H.R. 557) 
that  patent  license agreements  and other  contracts  relating  to the use of 
intellectual  property  "shall  not be deemed  illegal  per se under  any of the 
antitrust  laws." One consequence would be to eliminate the per se 
illegality  of tie-in  arrangements  (those in which  purchase  of one product, 
51.  For a calculation of the impact of the Drug Price Competition  and Patent Term 
Restoration  Act  of  1984, see  Henry Grabowski and John Vernon,  "Longer  Patents for 
Lower Imitation Barriers: The 1984 Drug Act, " Amer-ican  Economic Review, vol. 76 (May 
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the "tying  product,  " is dependent  on purchase  of other  products)  where 
the tying product is covered by a patent or otherwise protected as 
intellectual  property.52  Our  findings  have suggested  some issues a court 
should  consider  in evaluating  such a tying  arrangement  under  the rule  of 
reason. 
When  the rule of reason is applied  to tying cases, a relevant  consid- 
eration  is the firm's  power in the market  for the tying  good. Courts  have 
often presumed  that intellectual  property  protection is itself evidence 
for such power. To the other  good reasons  for rejecting  such a presump- 
tion,53  we add  that  the mere  existence of a patent  or  other  legal  protection 
says nothing  about its efficacy in a competitive  context. As the survey 
results showed, the effectiveness of protection varies widely among 
industries.  Thus  in deciding  a case, a court  should  inquire  into the actual 
competitive  significance  of intellectual  property  protection  in the partic- 
ular  market. 
Suppose, for example, that a pharmaceutical  company were to tie 
hospital sales of supplies or equipment  to its sale of a patented drug. 
Since patent  protection  of drugs  is generally  strong  and effective, and a 
drug  is often uniquely  suited for particular  purposes, skepticism  about 
the reasonableness  of the tie-in would be in order. The arrangement 
could not plausibly  be regarded  as a straightforward  means  of appropri- 
ating  returns  to which  the firm  was entitled  as owner  of the patent.  Given 
the typical effectiveness of drug patents, the price of the drug should 
suffice  for that  purpose.  There  might,  of course, be benign  explanations 
for  the  tie;  for  example,  if the supplies  or  equipment  were  complementary 
to the use of the drug,  the arrangement  might  be explicable  as an attempt 
to control the quality of treatment. But if no such explanation  were 
52.  We focus on this particular consequence  of the proposed legislation and set aside 
two major  considerations regarding its merits in its present form. First, without amendment 
the legislation is likely to undercut severely  the per se treatment of price fixing. Second,  it 
might  be more appropriate to consider eliminating per se treatment of all tying arrangements 
rather than just those  involving  intellectual  property. On this point,  see  the concurring 
opinion in Jefferson Parish v. Hyde, 466 U.S.  2 (1984). 
53.  See E. W. Kitch, "Patents: Monopolies  or Property Rights,"  in John Palmer, ed., 
Research in Law and Economics:  The Economics  of Patents  and Copyrights, vol. 8 (JAI 
Press, 1986), pp. 31-47; and the associated  commentary of F. M. Scherer, p. 51. Digidyne 
Corp. v. Data General Corp., 743 F. 2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1984) is an example of an application 
of  per  se  doctrine  in  a  context  where  the  intellectual  property  (software)  does  not 
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supported  by the evidence, the tie would  seem an unreasonable  restraint 
of trade. 
By contrast,  consider  a producer  of a patented  product  in an industry 
where no mechanism  of appropriability  functions particularly  well- 
plywood, for example, where patents, secrecy, lead time, and learning 
advantages  are all rated no higher  than four on a seven-point scale of 
effectiveness. In this instance  the low level of appropriability  in general 
and  the ineffectiveness  of patents  in particular  should  weigh  against  any 
presumption  that a patent  confers market  power. The patentee in such 
an industry  should  be entitled  to some scope for  ingenuity  in constructing 
arrangements  that  maximize  the return  to the patent,  provided  that  these 
arrangements  are not open to antitrust  objections  on grounds  indepen- 
dent of the role played  by the patent. 
The intellectual property provisions of  the Omnibus Trade and 
Competitiveness  Reform  Act also serve to illustrate  the relevance  of the 
survey results. One provision  requires  the U.S. trade  representative  to 
identify  countries  that  have been particularly  insensitive, as a matter  of 
law or de facto policy, to the need for protection  of intellectual  property 
and to initiate  unfair  trade  practice (section 301) investigations  against 
them.S4  This provision  of the trade  bill would complement  the adminis- 
tration's diplomatic  efforts to strengthen  intellectual property rights 
throughout  the world and particularly  in countries  that permit  firms  to 
copy patented  or copyrighted  products  from  the United States. 
Since the impact  of legal protection  of intellectual  property  depends 
on the strength  of other appropriability  mechanisms  and varies widely 
among  industries,  focused efforts to solve problems  in specific markets 
would be more prudent  than a broad attempt to upgrade  protection. 
There is little point in expending  diplomatic  capital to compel foreign 
countries  to pass or enforce laws that, in most industries,  would have 
minimal  impact  on the competitive  process. By contrast,  in  those specific 
industries  such as pharmaceuticals-in which  patent  protection  is effec- 
tive, other means of appropriation  are poor substitutes, and foreign 
governments  often restrict,  officially  or tacitly, the ability  of U.S. firms 
to exploit  patents-a  more  persuasive  case could  be made  for the United 
States to pressure  its trading  partners  to change  their  behavior. 
54.  The trade representative may at his discretion escape  this requirement by finding 
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Appendix:  Details of Sample Construction 
Our  review of the FTC data indicated  that several lines of business 
did not report  any R&D activity, and several  others were aggregated  to 
prevent  violating  confidentiality  rules. Anticipating  difficulty  in finding 
knowledgeable  respondents  in industries  without  formal  R&D activity, 
and wishing  to avoid industry  categories that included  technologically 
disparate products, we eliminated those lines of business from our 
sampling  frame. 
The  industries  eliminated  on grounds  of heterogeneity  were either  the 
FTC's aggregations  of technologically disparate industries or those 
corresponding  to SIC industries with four-digit  codes ending with 9. 
Such industries  are residual categories within the relevant three-digit 
groups; their titles usually contain the words "miscellaneous, not 
elsewhere  classified." 
Confidentiality  requirements  prohibited  us from using the FTC data 
as a means of identifying  the firms that conduct R&D in each line of 
business. Instead, we used the Business Week  annual  R&D survey to 
identify  all publicly  traded  firms  that reported  R&D expenses in excess 
of either 1 percent of sales or $35 million. This constitutes a nearly 
comprehensive  list of private  firms  performing  significant  R&D. There 
were  746  such  firms  in 1981,  when  our  survey  design  efforts  commenced. 
We used the information  in Dun and Bradstreet's Million Dollar 
Directory  to assign each of the Business Week  firms  to its major  lines of 
business. Dun and  Bradstreet's  does not provide  a complete  list of each 
firm's  lines of business, but it indicates as many as six four-digit  SICs 
for each firm, in rough order of sales. Since some firms operate in 
nonmanufacturing  industries, in manufacturing  industries  absent from 
our sample,  or in two or more  industries  that  fall into only one FTC line 
of business, we had substantially  fewer than 746  x  6 observations. 
Within  our sample lines of business, we found a total of 1,928 units 
operated  by 688  firms. 
A major  design problem  was how to obtain responses for business 
units within  the same firm. Of our 688 firms, 470 participated  in more 
than one of our sample lines of business. We initially attempted to 
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the United States.  But our pretest subjects told us that more than half 
the people  in such  a sample  were inappropriate.  Some had  been assigned 
to the wrong  line of business; others had been promoted  or had left the 
relevant  division  or the firm. 
We therefore adopted a two-stage approach in which each firm's 
senior  R&D  vice president  or  chief  executive officer  was asked  to furnish 
the names of employees with the knowledge  to complete the question- 
naire  for specific lines of business. We sent first-round  requests to 470 
firms representing 1,710 business units. There was attrition of 332 
business units from this sample for three reasons: the firm  did not do 
R&D in the specified  line of business, the industry  definition  did not fit 
any of its activities, or a respondent  could not be located. From this 
adjusted sample frame of 1,378 business units in firms with multiple 
units,  we received  names  of respondents  for  716. We sent questionnaires 
to each of these potential  respondents  as well as to representatives  of 
the 218 firms  operating  in only one line of business. At this stage, there 
was some further  attrition  in the sample. Ultimately, we received 650 
completed questionnaires  from an overall adjusted sample frame of 
1,562-an overall  response rate  of 41.6 percent. Comments 
and Discussion 
Richard  Gilbert: The authors'  research  program  will have lasting  value 
for people interested in R&D markets and markets for intellectual 
property.  They are  correct  in focusing  on appropriability  as a key factor 
in the incentive to undertake  R&D. And their findings are generally 
consistent  with  those of other  studies,  for  example,  those by Christopher 
T. Taylor  and Z. A. Silberston  and Edwin Mansfield,  Mark  Schwartz, 
and  Samuel  Wagner.  ' While  this consistency may  take  a bit of the drama 
out of what Levin and his colleagues have done, the convergence of 
knowledge  on this subject  gives us some reason to believe we might  be 
getting  to the truth. 
One of the authors' main conclusions is that there are very large 
differences,  both  among  industries  and  within  them, in the effectiveness 
of various  means of appropriating  intellectual  property  and also in the 
cost of imitation.  It is an important  result, but one that may cause some 
consternation.  A main function of microeconomic theory is to form 
testable generalizations  about the way the world works. Some of the 
work  implies-at least, in  the market  for  R&D  and  intellectual  property- 
that such generalizations  are extremely  risky. We might  be inventing  a 
new field of microeconomic  analysis, or "picoeconomics." Picoeco- 
nomics  would  keep us busy for a long, long time. But if we go down that 
path, our models will soon become as complicated  as the world we are 
trying  to explain. 
These particular  authors do not seem to want to lead us toward 
1. Christopher T. Taylor and Z. A.  Silberston,  The Economic  Impact of the Patent 
System: A Study of the British Experience (Cambridge University Press,  1973); and Edwin 
Mansfield,  Mark Schwartz, and Samuel Wagner, "Imitation Costs and Patents: An 
Empirical  Study,"  Economic  Journal, vol. 91 (December  1981),  pp. 907-18. 
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picoeconomics.  It is apparent  from  their  follow-up  work  that  they intend 
to draw some general conclusions about how appropriability  varies 
across industries.  Clearly,  we would  like to know how market  structure 
and capital intensity in different industries influence the degree of 
appropriation  and affect incentives to innovate. But merely adding 
appropriation  as another  explanatory  variable  in these regressions  does 
little  good. We  really  want  to know  whether  there  are  systematic  relations 
between the degree of appropriation  and other observable economic 
variables. 
With regard to methodology, I suggest using a weighting scheme 
based on the amount  of R&D a firm  does and, perhaps,  the number  of 
patents it has produced. The purpose would be to weight responses 
according  to the quality  of the information.  Some industries  seem not to 
have performed  any R&D  for twenty years. Although  it is important  to 
know why these firms  have not been active, their responses should be 
adjusted  to reflect  the information  they possess. Also, I suggest that in 
their survey work  the authors  include  a definition  of R&D. That  is not a 
trivial task because there is much variation  in what is called research 
and development. 
I would have liked the survey to address more directly some of the 
theoretical  issues in the economics of R&D. Various  models  in the R&D 
literature  have different  implications  for  the simultaneous  determination 
of R&D intensity and market  structure.  For example, models such as 
that of Partha  Dasgupta  and Joseph Stiglitz imply that the current  rate 
of R&D spending  should be indepenident  of cumulative  R&D expendi- 
tures by a firm  or the rivals of the firm.2  This is a consequence of the 
constant-hazard  rate  model. Other  researchers  such as Drew  Fudenberg 
and his colleagues imply that past R&D is crucial  to current  and future 
R&D  expenditures.3  The dynamic  implications  of these models  are very 
different. The preemption-type  models also suggest that a history of 
successful R&D gives a firm a technological  advantage  that provides 
some protection from future R&D competition and tends to increase 
concentration  in a market. 
2. Partha  Dasgupta  and  Joseph  E. Stiglitz,  "Uncertainty,  Industrial  Structure,  and  the 
Speed  of R&D,"  Bell Journal  of Economics,  vol. 11  (Spring  1980),  pp. 1-28. 
3. Drew  Fudenberg  and  others,  "Preemption,  Leapfrogging  and  Competition  in  Patent 
Races,"  European Economic Review, vol. 22 (June 1983), pp. 3-31. R.  C. Levin, A.  K. Klevorick, R. R. Nelson,  and S.  G.  Winter  823 
I would be interested in knowing if the survey could have elicited 
some  kind  of response  about  the  way R&D  success alters  the  competitive 
environment  of the firms  and, conversely, how the competitive  environ- 
ment  influences  R&D  spending.  The questions  in  which  the investigators 
ask how many firms  are viable competitors  with a given firm  and how 
many  could  replicate  its R&D  bear  on this question.  It is interesting  that 
the  number  of serious  rivals  for  each  firm  was small,  somewhere  between 
three  and six. 
There  is an  empirical  problem  with  surveys  of the  relationship  between 
competition  and R&D. If R&D really does have an effect on entry and 
competition,  then the sample  is necessarily  biased. There are potential 
competitors  who were not represented  in the sample  because the firms 
failed. How one accounts for the failures and puts them back in the 
sample  is a difficult  empirical  problem. 
In terms of patent policy, the diversity and effectiveness of patent 
protection  across industries  raises an obvious and interesting  question. 
How should  patent  policy deal with  the large  differences  in the values of 
patents  among  various  industries?  The authors  point to the example of 
the semiconductor  industry  and suggest that the industry  need not be 
any worse off as a consequence of the limited  patent protection  it has 
received. But one might  also question whether  the performance  of the 
pharmaceuticals  industry  might  have been improved  if patent  protection 
had  been circumscribed  to some extent. 
I have experimented  with a very simple model of optimal  patent  life 
with limited  appropriability.  It is basically  a Nordhaus-type  model with 
entry  and  spillovers  .4 It shows that  the optimal  patent  life is not a function 
of the size of the innovation, so one does not have to worry that there 
are big innovations  in some industries  and small innovations  in others. 
The optimal  patent life does, however, depend on elasticities of R&D 
and  its  benefits  and  costs. It  also depends  on the  degree  of appropriability, 
and  there  is the intuitive  answer  that  the optimal  life is inversely  related 
to the  extent  of private  appropriation  of the social value  of the invention. 
This  result  suggests  that  we need either  more  protection  in semiconduc- 
tors  or less protection  in the patent  drug  industry. 
The authors' survey provides a basis for contrasting  patents with 
4.  See William  D. Nordhaus, Invention, Growth, and Welfiase:A  Theor-etical  Treatment 
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other approaches  to protect  intellectual  property.  A patent  is a peculiar 
policy instrument.  It represents  an  unnatural  barrier  to market  entry  that 
is erected to facilitate  private  appropriation.  The survey suggests that 
other factors may be more important  as a means of appropriation,  and 
that  other  unnatural  barriers  might  be more  effective in stimulating  R&D. 
As an extreme example (which I am not proposing), a tax on capital 
could arguably  make  entry  more  difficult  and  therefore  stimulate  R&D. 
It would be useful to do a survey of the effectiveness of different  laws 
governing rights for intellectual  property in different countries in an 
industry such as pharmaceuticals,  which is one of the few in which 
patents  really  do seem to matter. 
The survey results suggest that patents are important  as a barrier  to 
entry  in the semiconductor  industry  not because they protect  an individ- 
ual innovation or invention but because they provide a hurdle for 
potential entrants,  who have to acquire a package of marketable  pro- 
cesses and  products  that  they can cross-license  to other  firms.  While  this 
seems an inappropriate  or at least unintended  outcome of the patent 
grant,  it might  well be that  by increasing  ordinary  barriers  to entry  in the 
semiconductor  industry,  the returns  to research  and  development  would 
be enhanced.  This  is another  illustration  of the  Schumpeterian  hypothesis 
and the tensions between strong  enforcement  of the antitrust  laws and 
the desire to provide a stable platform  for encouraging  investment in 
R&D. If these observations  with regard  to the semiconductor  industry 
generalize to other markets, they provide a starting  point for further 
reexamination  of the antitrust  laws in the context of industrial  R&D 
policy. 
Thus  this survey  has raised  some very interesting  questions.  Now we 
have to get on with their resolution. Thanks to this project, we have 
some of the data  we need for the  job. 
Zvi Griliches: We should  be grateful  to Richard  Levin  and  his associates 
for providing  us with a new and detailed  glimpse into a subject that is 
both very important  and also lacking in good data. Far too little fresh 
economics data is collected, and we all have much to learn from the 
effort of this endeavor. That I am going to quarrel  with some of the 
authors' assessments does not diminish  in my eyes the basic value of 
this enterprise. 
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individuals  located  in different  industries.  This multipurpose  survey  will 
have many uses as we learn more about the responses and how to 
interpret  them.  I will  focus on how these answers  can help  us learn  which 
industries  find  patents  an effective mechanism  for appropriating  returns 
from  innovative  effort,  which  ones do not, and  whether  mechanisms  are 
available  instead  of or in addition  to patents. 
"Conditions  of appropriability"  determine  the returns  from a given 
innovative effort and hence the incentive to engage in it. One would 
expect that  in industries  in which appropriability  is easy, there  would  be 
more  innovative  effort, higher  returns,  and  a faster  rate  of technological 
progress.  Such conditions  may not be a fixed, unchanging  characteristic 
of an industry,  however. As more inventive effort is pursued,  projects 
may become less easily appropriable,  information  may be leaked, and 
conditions  may  actually  equalize  among  industries.  The problem  here is 
the same as in most empirical  research  programs:  What  is exogeneous 
and  what  is endogenous? 
There  are two generic  problems  with using  the responses  from such a 
survey: Are the responses comparable  among individuals  and do they 
reflect  real  differences  among  industries?  Given  the use of a scale of one 
to seven, I remain  unsure  about whether  one person's response of five 
is equivalent  to another's  of four or six. Most questions  do not have an 
objective anchor and could, therefore, differ greatly in the meanings 
attached  to them by different  respondents. This may account for the 
large dispersion  in responses to most questions even within the same 
industry.  It also leads to the difficulty  of deciding  whether  the responses 
reflect real differences across industries or just random fluctuations 
among  individuals. 
There is a surprising  amount of variability  within industries  in re- 
sponses to the same question. Some questions, such as those on the 
effectiveness of patents, are reasonably  objective and seem to have a 
variance  among  industries.  Other  questions, such as whether  secrecy is 
effective, do not seem to be particularly  industry-specific  and do not 
discriminate  well among  industries.  Questions  about  lead time, secrecy, 
sales  effort,  and  service  quality  are  really  questions  about  different  ways 
of succeeding,  not about properties  of an industry.  It is well to have a 
long  lead  time  or to achieve secrecy, but  how is that  to be accomplished? 
These are not characteristics  over which either the firm  or the policy- 
makers  have  clear  control.  Patents  are  at least a somewhat  better  defined 826  Brookings  Papers  on  Economic  Activity,  3:1987 
Table 1.  Analysis of Variance of Differences among Industries in Responses to Questions 
on the Effectiveness of Different Appropriability Mechanisms 
Aggregated  industiy 
Individual responsea  responseb 
Question  Processes  Products  Pr  ocesses  Products 
Patents  to prevent duplication  1.9  2.8  3.4  5.5 
Patents  to secure  royalties  1.6  1.4  2.4  2.3 
Secrecy  1.2  1.2  1.3  1.3 
Lead  time  1.7  1.6  2.2  2.5 
Quickly down the learning curve  1.0  1.0  .9  1.2 
Superior sales or service  1.2  .9  .7  .9 
Average  of questions  1 and 2  2.1  4.8 
Average  of questions  3 through 6  1.1  1.6 
Source:  Authors' calculations. 
a.  Covers  541 responses  for 130 industries; approximate  .05 significance level  is  1.3. 
b.  Covers  620 responses  for 24 industries; approximate  .05 significance level  is  1.6. 
instrument,  and  we have some ideas about  how the patent  system could 
be tinkered  with. 
Table 1 presents my analysis of variance results for some of the 
responses derived from the Yale survey. (I am grateful to Levin for 
providing  me with the original  survey data.) It shows that there is more 
variance  among  industries  in the responses  to questions  on the effective- 
ness of patents, especially for products, and very little variance  in the 
other  questions  on conditions  for appropriability,  especially  for process 
innovations.  Process innovations  are clearly less industry-specific  and 
so is the importance  of superior  sales and service efforts. 
Another  way of seeing this problem  is to look at the authors'  table 6, 
which shows that for many of the nonpatent mechanisms the cross- 
correlation  among  methods  of appropriation  is lower at the aggregated 
industry  level than at the level of the individual  response. If industrial 
classification  mattered, one would expect higher correlations  for the 
aggregated  variables.'  This point is illustrated  by a very simple model. 
Assume that two questions  effectively measure  the same thing. Then a 
variance  components  model  for responses to these questions  would be 
Yqiy  =  mi +  a.  +  eq, 
where mi is the "true" industry  effect perceived by all individuals,  aj is 
1.  Y.  Grunfeld and  Zvi  Griliches,  "Is  Aggregation  Necessarily  Bad?"  Review  of 
Economics  and Statistics,  vol. 42 (February 1960), pp. 1-1  3. R.  C. Levin, A.  K. Klevorick, R. R. Nelson,  and S.  G.  Winter  827 
the individual  deviation  from  the average  respondent  independent  of the 
industry  he is in, and eqij  is the random  response error  associated with 
the particular  question q and individual ij. Taking these effects as 
independent  from each other, and assuming that the first component 
does not average out as one aggregates  within industries  but that the 
other ones do in proportion  to the average number  of respondents  per 
industry,  gives us a little model that can be fit to the observed  variances 
and covariances  at the micro and macro  industry  levels. The following 
material  shows the relevant  numbers  for two pairs  of questions:  whether 
product  patents  are  effective against  duplication  and  in securing  royalty 
income, and whether moving quickly down the learning curve and 
superior  sales and service efforts  are effective in protecting  the compet- 
itive advantage  of new products.  The two-question  expected variance- 
covariance matrix is 
Individual level  Industry level 
a2  +  (2  +  (J2  a2  +  (T2  (T2  + 
1)  2  +  (T2 /N 
(U2 + 
(I2)  L  ...  (T2 +  (T2 +  (T2  J  L2  (T  +  N 
A 
where mi  is the "true" industry  effect perceived  by all individuals,  aj is 
the individual  deviation  from  the average  respondent  independent  of the 
Product  Learning 
patents  Effective  curve  Secrecy 
IB1  IB2  IB5  IB6 
Individual  2.860  1.435  1.810  .803 
(N  =  643)  ...  2.748  ...  1.662 
Industry  .618  .384  .148  .013 
(N=  24)  ...  .376  ...  .075 
Implied  estimates 
(N=  27) 
(JIA  11.09  .820 
921  .34  <0 
The numbers  imply that the common variance between industries 
accounts  for  about  one-eighth  of the variance  at the level of the  individual 
response and more than half at the aggregated  industry  level. For the 
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negative. (For the patents  question  the correlation  rises from .51 at the 
level of the individual  respondent  to .80  for averages  at the NSF industry 
level, while for the two appropriability  questions the numbers  go from 
.46  to . 12,  implying  that  such  averaging  attenuates  ratherthan  strengthens 
the relationship  between the responses to such questions.) In short, 
while these questions might  be interesting,  they do not seem to be able 
to pick out significant  differences among industries. Coming quickly 
down the learning curve and providing superior services are about 
equally  effective. 
Do the results  of this survey  help  us explain  other  phenomena  besides 
the relationship  between answers to different  sets of related  questions 
within  the survey?  Looking  at the responses  to the questions  evaluating 
patents  and other appropriability  mechanisms,  the evidence appears  to 
be mixed. Levin, Cohen, and Mowery did not find the appropriability 
variables  significant  in explaining  differences  among  industries  in R&D 
intensity, even in the absence of industry  dummies.2  In a forthcoming 
paper  lain Cockburn  and Zvi Griliches  use the Yale survey responses, 
aggregated  to fifty-five  industries  at approximately  a 3-digit  SIC  level, to 
see whether the stock market  values the accumulated  patents and the 
current R&D policy of a firm more or less in industries where the 
appropriability  conditions  are  better  in some sense.3  Table  2 reproduces 
typical results from this study. Patent effectiveness measures help in 
some sense. The equations seem to imply that both accumulated  past 
patents and current  R&D moves are valued more by the market  when 
patent protection is effective. Other appropriability  measures do not 
help. But neither set of measures does better than  just an interaction 
with ten higher-level (2-digit)  industries dummies. The greater detail 
available in the Yale survey appears to be counterbalanced  by the 
(inevitably?) greater imprecision of these measures at the detailed 
industry  level. So there is something  there but not as much as might  be 
wished. But we should  be thankful  for there  is hope that  a more  detailed 
study  of these and  other  responses  in this survey  will help  us understand 
our world better. In particular, the information  on the differential 
2. Richard  C. Levin,  WesleyM.  Cohen,  and  David  C. Mowery,  "R&D  Appropriability, 
Opportunity,  and  Market  Structure:  New Evidence  on Some  Schumpeterian  Hypotheses,  " 
American Economic Review, vol. 75 (May 1985,  Papers and Proceedings,  1984), p. 23. 
3. lain Cockburn  and Zvi Griliches,  "Industry  Effects and Appropriability  Measures 
in the Stock Market's  Valuation  of R&D and Patents," working  paper  2465 (National 
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Table 2.  Stock Market's Valuation of R&D and Patents, 722 U.S.  Manufacturing 
Corporations, 1980a 
Variables  Coefficients 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
SP/Ab  .165  .380  .107  .249  .360  .077  .199 
(.100)  (.171)  (.167)  (.155)  (.170)  (.183)  (.161) 
K/Ac  . ..  . ..  .932  .335  .  .  .  .898  .342 
(.201)  (.178)  (.224)  (.175) 
NRd  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  11.96  ...  ...  12.24 
(1.37)  (1.38) 
pPpe  ...  .034  .019  .019  .035  .023  .019 
(.024)  (.024)  (.023)  (.024)  (.025)  (.024) 
PPP  * (SP/A)  ...  .236  .075  .098  .267  .115  .164 
(.116)  (.110)  (.101)  (.133)  (.142)  (.128) 
PPP-  (KIA)  ...  ...  .365  ...  ...  .432  ... 
(.130)  (.172) 
PPP-  NR  ...  ...  ...  2.788  ...  ...  2.60 
(1.231)  (1.39) 
NPPf  ...  ...  ...  ...  .039  .100  .054 
(.079)  (.089)  (.075) 
NPP  * (SP/A)  ...  ...  ...  ...  .127  .174  .290 
(.388)  (.432)  (.293) 
NPP  * (KIA)  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  .263  ... 
(.636) 
NPP *  NR  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  -1.89 
(4.77) 
R  2  .166  .172  .200  .310  .170  .198  .309 
Source:  Adapted from lain  Cockburn and Zvi Griliches,  "Industry Effects  and Appropriability Measures  in the 
Stock  Market's  Valuation  of  R&D  and  Patents,"  working  paper 2465  (National  Bureau  of  Economic  Research, 
December  1987), tables 3b and 5. 
a.  Dependent variable is log Q (market value divided by replacement value).  All equations contain also ten 2-digit 
SIC industry dummy variables  and a logarithm of  total assets  variable whose  coefficient  is  small but consistently 
significant, on the order of  -.03  (.01). 
b.  Stock of patents (30 percent depreciation  rate) divided by total net assets. 
c.  Cumulated R&D "capital"  stock  (15 percent depreciation  rate) divided by total net assets. 
d.  Net R&D investment  divided by net assets  (R  -  .15K)/A. 
e.  Sum of responses  to  "patents provide  protection  against duplication"  questions  for both process  and product 
innovations.  Averages  at a fifty-five industries (approximately  3.5 digit level)  aggregation. 
f.  Average of responses  to all other  "effectiveness  of nonpatent appropriability mechanisms"  questions. 
connectedness  of science in different  industries  is very intriguing  and 
may be of help in future analyses of the contribution  of science to 
technological  advance. 
General  Discussion 
Richard  Levin agreed with Zvi Griliches that the appropriability 
variables  could not discriminate  effectively among  more  than  about  ten 830  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  3:1987 
industry groupings, but he suggested that this may be a good thing, 
especially in light  of Richard  Gilbert's  concern  that studies such as this 
amount to "picoeconomics," from which no generalizations  can be 
drawn. Sidney Winter noted that the results suggest there may be a 
relatively  short list of variables  to consider  in an analysis of appropria- 
bility and incentives for R&D, and that ten industry groupings  may 
provide  all the information  needed. In other  dimensions,  a finer  division 
may be important.  For example, Levin pointed out that, relative to 
questions on lead time, learning curves, and duplication costs,  the 
questions  on patent  effectiveness  discriminate  better,  as do the questions 
on learning  and  information  spillover  and  those on duplication  time. 
Moreover,  he added,  a principal  conclusion,  that  patents  do not  matter 
very much except in the chemical industries  and in semiconductors, 
comes through regardless of  problems with questions about other 
mechanisms  of appropriation.  In these two industries,  the meaning  and 
role of patent protection is different. Chemical products are easy to 
patent  because the structure  of the molecule of each product  is unique, 
but patents are easy to invent around  because it is often possible to 
create  a discrete  but structurally  similar  product  with similar  properties. 
With semiconductors,  however, the innovation  process is cumulative, 
with each invention built very distinctly on the previous one. The 
innovation  provided  by one firm  makes  the product  invented  by another 
firm  more valuable. So the role patents play is to define the property 
rights  (usually  through  the licensing  process) so that  the proceeds  of this 
cumulative  process can be shared  and  innovation  can be encouraged. 
Griliches  also raised  questions  about  whether  the variables  measured 
in this study  are  appropriately  regarded  as exogenous. Sales and  service 
effort, for example, is  a choice variable for the firms, and hence 
effectiveness should be endogenous. Likewise, lead time should be 
thought of  as  an outcome of  the technology race, rather than an 
exogenous condition  of it. Winter  pointed  out that even the distinction 
of product  and  process may be somewhat  endogenous  in the sense that 
firms  take  into  consideration  the  importance  of secrecy  and  the  possibility 
of reverse engineering  in designing  their  products. Firms  often work to 
make  their  high-technology  products  inaccessible  to reverse  engineering, 
he noted, which  tends to make  these products  more  like processes from 
the standpoint  of appropriability. 
Several participants  seemed concerned  about problems  of measure- 
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techniques, such as weighting the responses by the inverse of the 
variances  or standard  deviations  of the individual  responses, were tried 
to correct  for these biases. The principal  findings  were robust  to efforts 
to stretch  or squeeze the distribution  of responses, he noted, but it was 
unclear  what such "corrections" mean since no one knows what the 
true  distribution  should  be. 
Joseph Farrell took issue with Gilbert's argument that it is  not 
particularly  interesting  or helpful to worry about the determinants  of 
R&D in industries  that do not perform  R&D. In fact, he suggested, it 
would be very useful to know why some industries  seem to do so little 
research  while others  do so much. Gilbert  agreed,  but argued  that  it was 
still important  to assign some sort of weights to individual  responses to 
particular  questions, based on the respondent's  experience with those 
issues. Martin  Baily argued  that weighting  the responses by how much 
R&D the responding  firms  do would be inappropriate,  however, since 
the amount  of R&D  is what the authors  are trying  to explain. 
Richard Schmalensee suggested that some of the within-industry 
variance  in the responses  about  sales and  service and  other  mechanisms 
of appropriation  may be due to the fact that the R&D executives who 
responded  to the questionnaire  are less knowledgeable  about  what  hap- 
pens to the product  after  it leaves theirjurisdiction  in the organization. 
Responding  to a question from Paul Joskow, Levin said if he were 
doing  the survey over again, he would want to do more pretesting.  For 
example,  the authors  might  have picked  up on the issue of intraindustry 
variance  earlier  if they had  pretested  multiple  respondents  from  the same 
industry.  Or they might  have learned  ways to restructure  questions to 
discriminate  more  carefully  between  exogenous  and  endogenous  factors. 
Robert  Litan noted that one implication  of the study  for trade  policy 
is that  issues of intellectual  property  rights  should  be dealt  with industry 
by industry.  This is, in effect, how section 301 of the Trade  Act already 
works, he  added. The  section provides a  procedure for pursuing 
complaints  about unfair  trade practices abroad, but these complaints 
must  be brought  product  by product.  Litan also suggested  that mecha- 
nisms  of appropriating  returns  from  R&D  might  vary between large  and 
small firms. Levin agreed, but noted that the sampling procedure 
surveyed  only publicly  held firms, so that start-up  ventures  were com- 
pletely excluded. Patents may be much more important  for a start-up 
company  because  they provide  something  tangible  to sell if the firm  tries 
to sell out later. 